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Introduction
Three years ago, nobody had ever heard of Napster or Gnutella. Within the past
few years, however, Napster and Gnutella, along with their subsequent imitators, have
grown into arguably the largest international networks of illegality in human history. At
its peak, Napster had 70 million users,1 the overwhelming majority of whom used the
service to obtain unlicensed copies of copyrighted sound recordings.2 Although adverse
court decisions eventually brought Napster to its knees, file-swapping users have simply
taken their “business” elsewhere, and a plethora of file-swapping networks, including
Gnutella, have taken Napster’s place. By November of 2001, another of these peer-topeer networks, the MusicCity / KaZaA network, claimed more simultaneous users than
Napster ever had.3 According to a recent estimate, as many as 40 million Americans use a
peer-to-peer network to obtain copyrighted content every week.4
There is something else happening with these networks besides the widespread
copyright infringement they encourage, and it may be even more interesting. After all,
there is little mystery as to why tens of millions of individuals have chosen to use these
networks to download free, high-quality, sound recordings. The more puzzling question
is why tense of millions of individuals have chosen to upload free, high-quality sound
recordings to their fellow anonymous users. Downloading content from a peer-to-peer
network depends entirely on another user’s willingness to upload such content. While
users of these networks have been free to download as much content as they want without
ever having to share their content with other users, substantial numbers of them still elect
1

Matt Richtel, With Napster Down, Its Audience Fans Out, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2001, at A1.
A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp.2d 896, 902-03 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (“The evidence
shows that virtually all Napster users download or upload copyrighted files and that the vast majority of the
music available on Napster is copyrighted.”).
3
Webnoize Estimates Nearly Two Billion Files Downloaded Using the Kazaa, MusicCity and Grokster
File-Sharing Applications in October, Nov. 5, 2001, available in
<http://webnoize.com/items.rs?ID=14652> (visited Dec. 2, 2001).
4
Doug Bedell, Pay to Play? No Way: New Legislation, Record Labels Are Going After File-Sharing
Networks, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE, July 29, 2002, at E3 (citing a recent study by Odyssey Research).
2
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to share. Seen in this light, the file-swapping networks are a triumph of cooperation and a
shining beacon of kindness to strangers.
In this article, I will provide an explanation for why tens of millions of Internet
users make their unlicensed copies of copyrighted content available to perfect strangers
despite the absence of obvious incentives for doing so. Drawing on the social
psychological literature that explores cooperation and altruism in the face of anonymity, I
propose that file-swappers share their content with anonymous strangers mainly because
charismatic technologies make the community of file-swappers appear to its users far
more cooperative than it really is. In so doing, the networks tap into deeply held social
norms of reciprocity that people develop offline and bring with them to cyberspace. I will
then use the file-swapping network as a case study for analyzing how cooperation and
social norms emerge in an environment characterized by anonymity and a lack of repeatplayer interactions. In short, I will present a hypothesis to explain the emergence of social
norms in a “loose-knit” environment.5
As this account suggests, robust, cooperation-encouraging social norms can
emerge where anonymity is widespread, provided the environment in which those
anonymous individuals interact is properly structured. I will propose that in this instance,
the ingenious structure of the file-swapping networks solidifies a norm of sharing, and
that this norm of sharing is reinforced by users’ mistaken but predictable notions of
reciprocity. If my account is correct, it suggests that the copyright industries’ efforts to
control copyright infringement on peer-to-peer networks have been wrongheaded. Rather
than moving sequentially against the various post-Napster networks, the copyright
industries might have adopted various strategies to create a norm of free-riding, thereby
cutting off the cooperative uploading on which these networks rely. I will consider those
strategies in the final pages of the article.
Part I of this article provides a technical, historical, and legal introduction to the
world of file-swapping on the Internet. This section provides context so that the
uninitiated may better understand the nature of the social phenomenon that is being
characterized in the remainder of the article. It then explores the ways in which users of
these networks cooperate despite the apparent absence of incentives to do so, and the
limitations on cooperation that the networks’ designers have had to attempt to overcome.

5

Close-knit environments are those in which repeat players can identify each other. See also ROBERT
C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 177-78 (1991) (“A group is close-knit when informal power is
broadly distributed among group members and the information pertinent to informal controls circulates
easily among them.”). Loose-knit groups, by contrast, are clusters of individuals who are unlikely to be
repeat players or are otherwise unlikely to be able identify each other in repeat interactions. While the legal
literature on close-knit groups is well-developed, legal scholars have only begun to turn their attention to
understanding loose-knit groups. See generally Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Social Norms from Close-Knit
Groups to Loose-Knit Groups, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2003).
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Parts II and III examine the emergence of two kinds of social norms that govern
human behavior with respect to file-swapping activities. The first of these, discussed in
Part II, is the norm that renders downloading behavior permissible, regardless of what the
copyright laws might say. The emergence of that norm can be explained plausibly
through a standard economic analysis supplemented by a traditional account of norm
creation.
Part III discusses a second norm—one that cannot be explained through the
existing tool set that social norms scholars have developed to analyze close-knit groups.
That norm holds that those who download content from peer-to-peer networks should
also make content available to other users. The article argues that this norm’s emergence
and survival can be best explained with reference to the social psychological literature
that examines why people generally cooperate with or behave altruistically toward
strangers. It suggests that even in loose-knit environments, individuals can be persuaded
to cooperate if they view others as cooperating. It further suggests that the file-swapping
networks have been so successful in large part because they have created an online
environment in which sharing appears to be far more prevalent than it really is. This
phenomenon is emblematic of what I call “charismatic code”—a technology that
magnifies cooperative behavior and masks uncooperative behavior.
Part IV applies some of the lessons gleaned from the foregoing discussion to the
policy choices that courts, legislatures, and private actors must confront in regulating fileswapping on the Internet. It suggests that courts and copyright holders have largely
botched their initial efforts to respond to the challenge posed by the file-swapping
networks. The Part then examines alternative strategies that copyright holders may
employ to weaken these networks: self-help and pricing mechanisms that raise the cost of
user cooperation. It turns out that an understanding of how social norms arise and thrive
in loose-knit environments suggests surprising strategies for undermining arguably
pernicious cooperation by file swappers. To illustrate, I suggest that the copyright
industries may be able to undermine the success of file-swapping networks by releasing
their own file-swapping programs that allow people to exchange files, but that make
uploading appear to be far less prevalent than it really is—thereby undermining the norm
of sharing. Alternatively, I argue that the record industry’s apparent strategy of uploading
flawed MP3 files onto the peer-to-peer networks is much more likely to succeed if done
surreptitiously, so that the users will begin blaming each other for the presence of these
files, prompting them to eschew future cooperation. Insights about charismatic code thus
can be useful to those wishing to control copyright infringement, but they might also be
useful to those who wish to strengthen the networks further. To that end, Part IV suggests
ways in which the networks could boost the already impressive levels of cooperation that
exist therein. A brief conclusion follows in Part V.
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I.

An Introduction to Napster, Gnutella, and the File-Swapping Hybrids

The term “killer app” is lingo in the software industry for a must-have application
that profoundly alters the experience of using a computer.6 The explosive growth of the
computer software industry during the 1980s and 1990s was sparked by such killer apps
as Lotus 1,2,3 (a spreadsheet program), WordPerfect (a word processor program), and
Netscape (an Internet browser). It is safe to say that during the year 2000 Napster became
the killer app du jour.7

A.

Napster
1.

Napster in Brief

Napster was a file-swapping program invented in 1999 by Shawn Fanning, a
Northeastern University undergraduate who wanted to create a network that would allow
him to trade MP3 music files8 with his friends over the Internet.9 Napster integrated two
basic functionalities: It compiled a searchable directory that allows users to locate desired
content on other users’ machines and combined that directory with a file transfer protocol
which allowed that content to be copied from one computer to another.10
Using Napster to exchange music files was very straight-forward. A user directed
his Internet browser to visit the Napster.com web site and download Napster’s
MusicShare software.11 That software catalogued the music files in designated drives on
a user’s computer and stored this catalog on Napster’s central servers. The software then
permitted the user to search through the catalog of MP3 files available on other users’
computers, and download the desired files. These files were then transferred from the

6

Clay Shirky, Listening to Napster, in PEER-TO-PEER: HARNESSING THE BENEFITS OF A DISRUPTIVE
TECHNOLOGY, at 21, 26 (Andy Oram ed. 2001) (“Whatever one thinks of Napster’s probable longevity,
Napster is the killer app for this revolution.”).
7
Karl Taro Greenfeld, Meet the Napster, TIME, Oct. 2, 2000, at 60 (“[Napster] already ranks among the
greatest Internet applications ever, up there with e-mail and instant messaging. In terms of users, the
Napster site is the fastest growing in history.”); see also Napster, 114 F. Supp.2d at 927 (finding that
Napster “has contributed to illegal copying on a scale that is without precedent”).
8
MP3s are a form of compressed music files that produce near-CD quality sound at a tenth the size of a
.WAV file, which was the prior software format for representing music. Robert T. Baker, Finding a
Winning Strategy Against the MP3 Invasion: Supplemental Measures the Recording Industry Must Take to
Curb Online Piracy, 8 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 1, 6 (2000).
9
Damien Riehl, Peer-to-Peer Distribution Systems: Will Napster, Gnutella, and Freenet Create a
Copyright Nirvana or Gehenna?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1761, 1766 (2001).
10
Expert Report of Professor Lawrence Lessig Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B)
¶48, A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., C 99-5183 MHP (ADR) (N.D. Cal.).
11
Riehl, supra note 9, at 1767.
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host user’s computer to the requester’s computer via a peer-to-peer connection over the
Internet.12
Once a user logged in to the Napster network, there were a couple of ways in
which she could locate files for downloading. Napster provides a search function
whereby a user could locate files in fellow user’s directories after searching by artist
name or song name. She could then see not only which users have the files on their
directories, but how fast their Internet connections are. After conducting an initial search,
the user had several search options. She could search for another artist or song. Or she
could examine the file directory of a particular user who showed files satisfying the first
search criteria to see what other files that user had made available for downloading. For
example, a user interested in expanding her jazz horizons might have searched for files
containing music by a well-known artist such as Miles Davis or Louis Armstrong and
subsequently looked at the directories belonging to users who have extensive collections
of Davis or Armstrong recordings. In that way, users found high-quality music made by
an artist of whom they had never previously heard.
Napster users occasionally engaged in virtual conversations with the users who
were supplying them with music files. For example, a user looking for music by a
relatively obscure artist could find another user with a substantial collection of that
artist’s works. The user began to download the music and, at the same time, paged the
uploading user to see if he was interested in exchanging instant messages about the artist.
Napster also hosted chat rooms that involved many users simultaneously.13 Napster
thereby permitted music lovers to share information and conversation with others who
had similar tastes.

2.

Napster’s Growth

A firm that monitors Internet usage reported that Napster was the fastestspreading application ever tracked on the Net.14 By the summer of 2000, less than one
year after the program’s launch, Napster use was widespread. Thirty-seven percent of
Internet users in the United States had listened to or downloaded music off the Internet.
Of these, 54% had used Napster to download music.15 A little more than half of Napster’s
70 million users were in the United States, but significant user populations existed in
Canada, Australia, Brazil, Germany, and the United Kingdom.16
12

Id.
Napster, 114 F. Supp.2d at 907.
14
Amanda Lenhart & Susannah Fox, Downloading Free Music: Internet Music Lovers Don’t Think It’s
Stealing, Pew Internet & American Life Project’s Online Music Report, at 4 (Sep. 28, 2000).
15
Id. at 7, 11.
16
Jupiter Media Metrix Reports Multi-Country Napster Usage Statistics for February 2001, LEXIS PR
Newswire, Apr. 5, 2001.
13
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Napster fueled a surge in music downloading off the Internet. Between July of
2000 and February 2001, the number of Americans who had downloaded music off the
Internet increased by more than 40%.17 The majority of those Americans between the
ages of 12 to 29 who have Internet access had downloaded music files via the Net.18
Napster users began amassing increasingly large collections of MP3 files. In April of
2000, the average uploading Napster user had approximately 100 MP3 files available for
sharing.19

3.

The Napster Litigation and Its Fallout

On December 6, 1999, a group of several record labels sued Napster for
contributory and vicarious20 copyright infringement.21 The district court denied Napster’s
motion for summary judgment on May 5, 2000, rejecting the company’s claims that its
service fell within the safe harbor provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17
U.S.C.A. § 512(a).22 On July 26, 2000, the district court essentially sided with the
recording industry on the merits, granting its motion for a preliminary injunction to
prevent Napster from engaging in contributory and vicarious infringement of the
recording industry’s copyrights.23 The district court enjoined Napster from “engaging in,
or facilitating others in copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting, or distributing
plaintiffs’ copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings . . . without express
permission of the rights owner.”24 The court placed the burden of removing access to
copyrighted works on Napster, but ordered the plaintiffs to assist Napster by identifying
the works in which they own copyrights.25 Shortly before the injunction was to become
effective, the Ninth Circuit granted Napster’s application for a stay pending appeal.26
While the case was awaiting the Ninth Circuit’s review, the free publicity that Napster

17

Mike Graziano & Lee Rainie, The Music Downloading Deluge: 37 Million American Adults and
Youth Have Retrieved Music Files on the Internet, Pew Internet & American Life Project’s Online Music
Report, at 2 (April 24, 2001).
18
Id.
19
Id. at 3.
20
One who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or otherwise materially
contributes to the infringing conduct of another is potentially liable for contributory copyright
infringement. Vicarious liability arises when one party has direct control over an infringer and benefit’s
from that infringer’s unlawful activities.
21
A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C 99-05183 MPH, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6243, at *1
(N.D. Cal. May 5, 2000).
22
Id. at *29-30.
23
Napster, 114 F. Supp.2d at 918-22.
24
Id. at 927.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 927 n.32.
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garnered through coverage of the litigation helped Napster’s user base grow
dramatically.27
On February 12, 2001, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
determination that Napster had likely engaged in contributory and vicarious copyright
infringement.28 The court did alter the district court’s injunction somewhat, finding that
the injunctive order was overbroad to the extent that it placed upon Napster the primary
onus to ensure that its network was free of copyrighted content.29 The court thought it
more appropriate to “place the burden on plaintiffs to provide notice to Napster of
copyrighted works and files containing such works available on the Napster system
before Napster has the duty to disable access to the offending content.”30
Three weeks later, the district court modified its injunction on remand.31 The
court required the plaintiffs to provide Napster with a list of songs and artist names
whose copyrighted content was being traded on Napster.32 The court further ordered
Napster to be diligent in preventing circumvention of the spirit of the court’s injunction
through “variations of the filename(s), or of the spelling of the titles or artists’ names, of
the works identified by the plaintiffs.”33 Under the court’s order, Napster would have
three days to prevent a copyrighted file that plaintiffs’ identified from being swapped via
the network.34 In order to comply with the injunction, Napster installed “filtering”
software on its servers that would prevent certain copyrighted files from appearing when
one user searched another user’s directory. Moreover, Napster’s search function was
rigged so that when a user types in a search query such as “Rolling Stones,” the network
immediately returned the response “No files found.” This injunction essentially killed
Napster, such that by September of 2002, Napster was no longer operating, had laid off
virtually all its employees, and appeared headed for liquidation.35

B.

Gnutella

Approximately one year after Napster’s creation, Gnutella, a new file-swapping
program, was released over the Internet.36 Presently, there are several different Gnutella
applications, all of which use the same basic network and file-swapping technologies.
27

JOHN ALDERMAN, SONIC BOOM: NAPSTER, MP3, AND THE NEW PIONEERS OF MUSIC 143 (2001).
A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004,1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001).
29
Id. at 1028.
30
Id.
31
A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C 99-05183 MHP, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2186 (N.D. Cal.
Mar 5, 2001).
32
Id. at *4.
33
Id. at *5.
34
Id. at *7.
35
Matt Richtel, Napster Says It Is Likely to Be Liquidated, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 4, 2002, at C2.
36
Gene Kan, Gnutella and GoneSilent.com, in PEER-TO-PEER, supra note 6, at 94, 95; Riehl, supra note
9, at 1774.
28
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The most popular Gnutella applications are currently BearShare, Limewire, Qtraxmax,
XoloX, and Gnucleus.37 Although their interfaces and features vary somewhat, all these
applications share the same network, meaning that a BearShare user can exchange files
with a Limewire user without difficulty.

1.

Gnutella’s Structure

Gnutella’s network is more versatile than Napster’s was in that it allows users to
exchange software files in any format, rather than just MP3 files.38 Scanned photographs,
text files, and motion pictures can therefore be exchanged over the Gnutella network. Not
surprisingly, the Gnutella network has become quite popular among users wishing to
exchange copies of movies and pornographic images.
A user searching for software files on Gnutella does so in a manner somewhat
similar to a Napster search.39 After logging into the Gnutella network, his computer will
connect to a number of other computers running a Gnutella application. That user may
then type any search phrase into the software, be it an artist’s name, album title, song
name, or some combination thereof. His computer then asks the other computers to which
it is connected whether they contain files that match the search description. These
computers will in turn query the computers to which they are connected, and so on and so
on.40 Eventually, many of the computers connected to a particular network (a maximum
of 10,000 machines41) will be asked whether they have files that match the search query,
and will return any affirmative responses to the requesting computer.42 The user is then
able to sort the affirmative responses by variables such as Internet connection speed or
file size. Once the user requests to download a particular file from a particular user, a
peer-to-peer connection between their computers is established via the Internet and the
file is copied from the uploader to the downloader.
Until recently, Gnutella did not permit users to scan the directories of a particular
user to see what other files they have available. In place of that handy Napster function,
however, Gnutella offers a fascinating voyeurism tool entitled “Monitor.” A Gnutella
user can observe, at any given time, a scrolling list of queries that other users have

37

Most Popular Downloads, available in <http://download.com.com/3150-2166-0-1-4.html?> (visited
August 5, 2002).
38
For an excellent, detailed overview of how Gnutella works, see Kan, supra note 36, at 94-122.
39
The text that follows is based on a description of BearShare, currently the most popular application
for searching the Gnutella network. The user experience varies slightly on LimeWire, Gnotella, and other
Gnutella applications.
40
Expert Report of Lawrence Lessig, supra note 10, at ¶¶ 50-51.
41
Kan, supra note 36, at 110; What Is Gnutella?, available in
<http:/www.gnutellanews.com/information/what_is_gnutella.shtml> (visited July 1, 2001).
42
<http:/www.gnutellanews.com/information/what_is_gnutella.shtml> (visited July 1, 2001).
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recently entered into their Gnutella search engines. Such searches reveal the eclectic
tastes of Gnutella’s users43 and often inspire users to duplicate a particular search.
Unlike Napster’s software, the Gnutella network does not rely on any central
server to store a directory of the files available on users’ systems. Rather, all the
computers plugged into the network function as mini-servers. In an era when lawsuits and
injunctions are the primary tool for preventing copyright infringement on the Internet,
this decentralized structure makes it relatively difficult to police (and ultimately shut
down) Gnutella.44 Indeed, Gnutella’s creators bill their program and network as one that
is impervious to legal control.
Gnutella can withstand a band of hungry lawyers. How many realtime
search technologies can claim that? Not Napster, that’s for sure. Just to
emphasize how revolutionary this is: hungry lawyers are probably more
destructive than nuclear weapons. There are a few things that will prevent
Gnutella from being stopped by lawyers, FBI, etc. First, Gnutella is
nothing but a protocol. It’s just freely accessible information. There is no
company to sue. No one entity is really responsible for Gnutella. Second,
Gnutella is not there to promote the piracy of music. It’s a technology, not
a music-piracy tool. The important thing is that Gnutella will be here
tomorrow. It’s reliable, it’s sharing terabytes of data, and it is absolutely
unstoppable.45
This rhetoric may be overblown and unsophisticated, but neither lawyers nor server
failures have been able to bring down Gnutella since its birth.46 Faced with the
unattractive prospect of filing individual lawsuits against the many copyright-infringing
users on Gnutella’s networks, the music and motion picture industries have so far held
43

For example, a random search conducted on August 4, 2001, revealed that users were searching for
popular music (“matchbox 20,” “Michael Jackson,” “Cypress Hill,” and “Classic Rock”), motion pictures
(“Top Gun,” “The Exorcist,” “Sleepy Hollow,” “Enemy at the Gates”), computer software applications
(“Easy CD Creator 5”), and pornography (“Kiddie mpg,” “Girls Gone Wild,” and “Barely Legal 6”).
44
Robert E. Litan, Law and Policy in the Age of the Internet, 50 DUKE L.J. 1045, 1068-69 (2001).
45
What Is Gnutella?, supra note 41.
46
As Damien Riehl explains, “Traditionally, copyright holders have been able to sue questionably
infringing sites because the companies are identifiable, have a physical presence in a jurisdiction, and can
be found on a machine in a specific geographic location. . . . Those considering legal action against
Gnutella, however, would not have the luxury of an easy target to sue, since the infringers and their
computers may be located around the world and could number in the millions. Since there is no one
company behind Gnutella, but it is only a loose-knit group of individuals who often participate in noncommercial file exchanges, copyright holders are left without any significant coffers to sue and some
nearly insurmountable jurisdictional hurdles to overcome. Furthermore, any attempt by entertainment
industry copyright holders would likely be a legal and public relations nightmare. The minimal damages
that could be recovered from infringing users would not justify the cost and time involved in attempting to
assert jurisdiction against millions of individuals in a myriad of jurisdictions.” Riehl, supra note 9, at 177879; see also Jon Healy, Gnutella Targeted for Piracy Control: Unlike Napster, the Decentralized Network
Cannot Be Sued by Record Labels, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2001 (discussing the legal difficulties faced by the
RIAA if it wishes to shut down Gnutella).
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their fire against Gnutella’s developers and users.47 Not surprisingly, Gnutella’s creators
have exhibited a general disdain for capitalism in general and intellectual property rights
in particular.48

2.

Gnutella’s Growth

In part because it was initially less user-friendly and efficient than Napster, in part
because of Napster’s first mover advantage in the marketplace, and in part because of less
aggressive marketing, Gnutella’s file-swapping network did not catch on nearly as
quickly as Napster’s. Gnutella usage received a major boost, however, after the Ninth
Circuit ordered Napster to start complying with copyright laws. Indeed, Internet watchers
reported a 17 percent increase in Gnutella usage on the day after the Napster decision
was handed down, relative to the previous day.49 That trend continued as Napster began
making it more difficult for users to access copyrighted MP3 files.50 As Napster users
began to anticipate the eventual demise of Napster-as-they-knew-it, they and new fileswappers increasingly began using Gnutella as a Napster substitute.51

C.

File-Swapping Hybrids

In the past year, a number of hybrid software programs, such as MusicCity’s
Morpheus, KaZaA, and Audiogalaxy Satellite, have been distributed over the Internet.
These programs combine Napster’s efficient downloading with Gnutella’s decentralized
structure and support of many different file formats. Several of these networks, such as
the one that serves KaZaA and Grokster52 were created by companies based outside the
47

John Borland, RIAA: Gnutella not yet a Threat, ZDNet News, Mar. 29, 2001, available in
<http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,5080393,00.html> (visited July 1, 2001).
48
ALDERMAN, supra note 27, at 148.
49
Id. (quoting Kelly Truelove, CEO of Clip2.com); see also Janelle Brown, The Music Revolution Will
not Be Digitized, Salon.com, June 1, 2001, available in
<http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2001/06/01/digital_music/print.html> (visited June 1, 2001)
(discussing the spike in Gnutella usage after the Napster decision); Lee Gomes, Renegade Gnutella May
Become a Web Standard, WALL ST. J., May 29, 2001.
50
Richtel, supra note 1, at A1 (“Figures to be released today show that a precipitous drop in Napster’s
traffic over the last several weeks has been paralleled by marked growth in more than half a dozen less
centralized services.”); Napster: Company Is Not Dead, May 13, 2001, available at
<http://news.findlaw.com/ap_stories/high_tech/1700/5-3-2001/20010503072217100.html> . (visited May
13, 2001); Ron Harris, Napster Use Slumps as Screening Technology Takes Hold, Salon.com, Mar. 16,
2001, available in <http://www.salon.com/tech/wire/2001/03/16/napster/index.html> (visited Mar. 16,
2001).
51
Baker, supra note 8, at 17; Elaine O’Connor, Who Needs Napster? Peer-to-Peer Sharing Thrives:
Record Companies Have Shut Down the Best-Known Site, but Music ‘Sharing’ Continues to Grow,
OTTAWA CITIZEN, Aug. 17, 2002, at J1.
52
In February of 2002, Morpheus switched over from this network to the Gnutella network. Farhad
Manjoo, Sour Notes, July 30, 2002, available in
<http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2002/07/30/file_trading/> (visited July 30, 2002).
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United States. The file-swapping hybrids generally “scale” better than Gnutella does,
which means that when a user logs into the network, he is able to access the content
hosted by a larger number of users and, accordingly, has a larger library of files from
which to choose.53 Moreover, whereas Gnutella servers use every computer on the
network as a mini-server to facilitate searching, hybrid applications automatically locate
the most powerful computers on the network with the highest speed connections, and use
only those computers as mini-servers. The result is a noticeably faster network and a
more efficient process for searching.54
While the Gnutella network has gained significant traffic in the wake of
Napster’s downfall, the file-swapping hybrids have been the primary beneficiaries.55
During a single week in August of 2001, 2.8 million people downloaded the three most
popular hybrid applications. During the first week of August, 2002, almost 3.7 million
people downloaded the three most popular file-swapping applications. Although it is
difficult to gauge the precise number of users on these networks, the largest two, KaZaA
and MusicCity Morpheus, have been downloaded more than 200 million times between
them, and the next three most popular, Audiogalaxy Satellite, BearShare, and Limewire,
account for an additional 60 million downloads.56 These numbers are rendered
particularly important by the network externalities that exist on the file-swapping
networks: The more users a network has, the more content generally will be available,
and, as a result, the more attractive the network will become to new members.57
Nevertheless, the music and motion picture industries have recently begun to pursue legal
actions against the creators of these hybrid sites.58 Some of these actions have been
53

MICHAEL MILLER, DISCOVERING P2P 165 (2001); FAQ, available in
<http://www.musiccity.com> (visited Aug. 15, 2001). For further discussions of scalability, see
<http://www.webreview.com/mmedia/2001/03_02_01.shtml> (visited August 9, 2002) (discussing
Gnutella), and <http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1107-861914.html> (visited August 9, 2002) (discussing
hybrids).
54
Id.
55
Farhad Majoo, Gnutella Bandwidth Bandits, Aug. 8, 2002, available in
<http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2002/08/08/gnutella_developers/index.html> (visited Aug. 8,
2002); Mark Lewis, Does Morpheus’ Architecture Save MusicCity from Legal Liability, Aug. 23, 2001,
available in <http://news.webnoize.com/item.rs?ID=13863> (visited Aug. 26, 2001) (noting that use of the
combined Morpheus / KaZaA networks grew by 89% in June, and that by August there were more than
700,000 users on the network simultaneously).
56
According to download.com, as of August 8, 2002, KaZaA had been downloaded 101,988,592 times;
Morpheus 98,244,630 times; Audiogalaxy 31,101,312 times; Bearshare 17,392,192 times; and Limewire
13,794,741 times. <http://download.com.com/3120-2001-0-1-4.html?qt=napster&ca=2001> (visited
August 8, 2002). There is certainly overlap among downloaders, since some users may have experimented
with several different applications. Some users may have downloaded the same applications more than
once because of installation difficulties. Still, a very conservative estimate extrapolating from this data
suggests that at least 100 million computer users have experimented with file-swapping applications.
57
Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1257, 1281-84
(1998).
58
Business Week, Napster’s Sons: Singing a Different Tune?, Feb. 21, 2002, available in
<http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/feb2002/nf20020221_6377.htm> (visited Aug. 8, 2002).
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successful, such as the RIAA’s copyright infringement lawsuit against AudioGalaxy and
the subsequent settlement that required AudioGalaxy to block users from swapping the
vast majority of the songs that would otherwise be available over the network.59

D.

Cooperative Behavior on Napster, Gnutella, and the Hybrids

In order to describe user conduct on the peer-to-peer networks precisely, it will be
necessary to deviate somewhat from the vocabulary used by the creators of those
networks. Members of the networks themselves refer to participation in the networks as
“file-sharing” or “file-swapping.” The two phrases are used interchangeably. In this
article, I use the phrases to mean different things, and these divergent meanings will
become quite important in the text that follows. I refer to “file sharing” as making one’s
files available for others to download (i.e., making at least some of the media files on
one’s hard drive available to members of the network). By contrast, I use “file swapping”
to refer to general participation in the network, whether as a downloader, an uploader, or
both.60
In the few years since the file-swapping applications were created, several
behavioral trends have remained constant. These trends have been observable on Napster,
Gnutella, and the hybrids. First, file-sharing, although entirely optional, is sufficiently
common to cause the network to function efficiently.61 Second, the material available for
downloading is generally of high quality and accurately labeled. Third, transmission
disruptions are relatively common. Each phenomenon is worthy of further attention.

59

Eliot Van Buskirk, File Sharing After Audiogalaxy, June 21, 2002, available in
<http://electronics.cnet.com/electronics/0-3219397-8-20067407-1.html> (visited August 8, 2002).
60
Thus, based on the definitions above, someone who downloads files from others but does not upload
any files is a file swapper but not a file sharer. Someone who both uploads and downloads files is a file
swapper and a file sharer.
61
It is surprising that all of the major file-swapping networks have relied on norms to encourage
uploading rather than enforcing hard and fast rules requiring uploading. More precisely, it would be
possible for programmers to design a file-swapping network that allowed users to download ten files for
free and subsequently required users to upload one file for every five files they downloaded. Why has no
successful system adopted this strategy? Part of the explanation may be that tracking individual users’
uploading to downloading ratios requires storage of such information, and storage of such information
potentially makes it available to subpoena by copyright holders, which could then target the most active
uploaders for legal action. By the same token, requiring their users to upload might make the peer-to-peer
networks more plainly guilty of vicarious copyright infringement for all member uploads, since having
control over an infringers’ actions is an element in vicarious copyright infringement. Finally, recall that the
peer-to-peer networks compete with each other for “market share.” The network creators may have decided
that instituting any impediments to downloading would have placed them at a competitive disadvantage
visa vi other networks that had no such impediments. Thus, even though file-sharers would prefer to upload
files to other file-sharers, they might also prefer a system where they did not have to monitor their own
upload/download ratios in order to acquire content.
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1.

Files Are Shared in Sufficient Quantities

The file-swapping networks do not require those users who wish to download
files to make their own files available for others to download. There are few reliable
statistics on the extent of file-sharing on Napster and Gnutella. The only comprehensive
study, by Adar and Huberman, looked at the prevalence of file-sharing on the Gnutella
network during a single 24-hour period in August of 2000.62 According to that study,
approximately 66% of those users who were logged into the network shared no files and
73% of users shared ten files or less.63 The authors also concluded that bandwidth (the
speed of an uploader’s Internet connection) did not affect file-sharing significantly.64
In describing the implications of their data, Adar and Huberman predicted that if
no more than one-third of all file-swappers continued to make their files available for
others to download, the Gnutella network could be destroyed through what they call the
“tragedy of the digital commons.”65 In the authors’ words:
If distributed systems such as Gnutella rely on voluntary cooperation,
rampant free riding may eventually render them useless, as few
individuals will contribute anything that is new and high quality. Thus, the
current debate over copyright might become a non-issue when compared
to the possible collapse of such systems.66
Adar and Huberman thus predict the potential downfall of file-sharing on Gnutella. As
users become decreasingly willing to upload files to others, less content is available on
the network and downloaders find that there is increased competition to obtain the
content that is available—the uploaders can establish viable peer-to-peer connections
with only so many downloaders at a time, after all.
62

Eytan Adar & Bernardo A. Huberman, Free Riding on Gnutella, FIRST MONDAY at 7 (Oct. 2000),
available in <http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/isse5_10/adar/index.html> (visited Aug. 6, 2002).
63
Id. at 8-9.
64
Id. at 11-12. But see Chakotay@voyager.student.utwente.nl, Distributed File Sharing System
Problematics, Oct. 23, 2000, available in <http://www.kuro5hin.org/story/2000/10/23/3027/2141> (visited
Aug. 20, 2001) (providing anecdotal evidence that free-riding on Napster is largely a function of users’
connection speeds). If no one chose to download songs from those with slower-speed connections, then
there would be nothing surprising about the lack of differential in sharing rates. The architecture of the
networks indicates, however, that dial-up uploaders do not get a free pass. The recent versions of peer-topeer software permit users to “swarm download”, i.e., download different identical files from several
machines simultaneously to speed up the transfer time. The peer-to-peer applications thus encourage users
to download portions of the same file from several other users at a time, meaning that a single download
will burden both the slower and faster machines serving a particular file. As a result of this innovation,
those with slower Internet connections now serve more uploads than they used to when users were only
able to download a file from one machine at a time. Moreover, my own experience with searching for
relatively obscure sound recordings on the networks reveals that a server with a modem connection is often
the only source for a particular file on the Gnutella network. This trend is particularly pronounced for
music by non-Western artists. In such instances, where a modem user is the only provider of particular
content, she can expect that downloads will absorb significant quantities of her bandwidth.
65
Adar & Huberman, supra note 62, at 16.
66
Id.
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Adar and Huberman’s pessimistic characterization of file-sharing on the Gnutella
network mostly misses the mark. While they observe that only a third of Gnutella users
make content available for downloading and predict the collapse of the system as a result,
they fail to recognize that this third collectively makes more than enough content
available for the network to function effectively.67 In the words of Clay Shirky, “as long
as even a small portion of the users [file-share], the system will grow, bringing in more
users, who bring in more songs.”68 Moreover, rather than focusing on why two-thirds of
all users download from the Gnutella network but do not upload to the network, a more
pertinent inquiry might ask why fully one-third of all Gnutella users upload despite the
practical absence of any incentive to do so. A more accurate picture of the file-swapping
networks emphasizes that the glass is not two-thirds empty, but rather one-third full.69
Gnutella’s vulnerability stems not from the absence of sharing, but from the
relatively small number of users who create the new content.70 In order for a file to
appear on the network, someone must go through the trouble of converting media to
digital format. In the case of MP3 files “ripped” from existing CDs, this is easily
accomplished with widely available software. In the case of recently released motion
pictures, it requires some level of industriousness. In any event, once this relatively small
number of users release popular new content on the network, they can count on the onethird of users who file-share to spread the new file.
While Adar and Huberman’s data is interesting and useful, the lack of follow-up
work and peer review has been frustrating, particularly given the idiosyncratic nature of
the early Gnutella applications.71 Free-riding appears to be more prevalent on early
Gnutella than on other file-swapping networks. The default user settings on Napster, as
67

The 33,335 hosts sampled by the Adar and Huberman study were sharing some 3,100,464 files. Id. at
8. Data obtained one year later revealed that more users were logging into the network, but that the average
user was sharing a bit less. At <http://www.Clip2.com>, it used to be possible to view a daily assessment of
the extent of file-swapping on the Gnutella network. On August 4, 2001, 42,572 users were using a portion
of the public Gnutella network simultaneously (as opposed to the 33,335 hosts Adar and Huberman
observed over the course of a 24-hour period). Those users were sharing 2,345,850 files containing 53,432
gigabytes of data. Thus, even with a majority of Gnutella users free-riding, the mean Gnutella user was
sharing more than a gigabyte of data contained in just over 51 files.
68
Shirky, supra note 6, at 33.
69
The appropriate analogy for file-sharing may be to a professional baseball player whose batting
average is .333, which is considered to be very high, even though it means that he gets a hit in far less than
half his at bats. In some other instances, 33% noncooperation would prove entirely unviable in maintaining
a system. For example, if even a third of all beach-goers littered indiscriminately, the beach would quickly
become spoiled and lose much of its appeal. Cristina Bicchieri, Norms of Cooperation, 100 ETHICS 838,
845 (1990).
70
Healy, supra note 46.
71
Finney.org, Incentives for Sharing in P2P Networks, June 13, 2001, available in
<http://www.geocrawler.com/archives/3/5025/2001/6/50/5957312> (visited Aug. 20, 2001) (arguing that
free loading is less common where a file-swapping network’s default configuration is to allow sharing of
all downloaded files, and that many Gnutella applications that were popular at the time of the Adar and
Huberman study did not permit users to share files).
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well as on hybrid programs and more recent Gnutella applications,72 provided that after a
user has downloaded a file, his copy of that file would be available for other users to
download from him.73 (In other words, the user’s download directory would, by default,
be treated as a “shared” directory from which other users on the network could
download.) Similarly, Napster and Morpheus both contained a default setting whereby
uploading was enabled whenever the computer on which it was installed was activated.74
A user with Napster installed therefore could be uploading copyrighted material
obliviously while she was writing a term paper using Microsoft Word. As a result of these
default settings, the onus was on the free-riding user to opt out of the file-sharing system.
Opting out usually required a user to select the application’s “Options” button and then
check an easily visible box containing text stating that the user was disabling sharing with
other users. The cost of locating and checking this box, though minimal, prompted lazy,
unsophisticated, or ambivalent network users to make their files available for others to
download.75 As a result, some users abide by the default choice regardless of whether that
choice is pro-sharing or anti-sharing.76 Early Gnutella applications, by contrast,
sometimes required users to opt-in to file-sharing. Adar and Huberman were thus
studying a very early version of the Gnutella network, a network that was used by a
relatively small population of users, and one in which cooperation was relatively difficult.
In November of 2001, I conducted a follow-up study of the MusicCity / KaZaA
network, which was more popular, had many more users, and was easier to study than
Gnutella. Data from that study revealed that 68% of music file-swappers shared at least
one file, and 53% shared more than ten files.77 The median network user was sharing 18
72

Earlier versions of Gnutella applications did not default into any particular uploading arrangement.
The user was asked what he wanted to share and selected the appropriate directories on his hard drive.
73
Kelly Truelove & Andrew Chasin, Morpheus Out of the Underworld, July 2, 2001, available in
<http://www.openp2p.com/pub/a/p2p/2001/07/02/morpheus.html> (visited August 4, 2001).
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Id.
75
Philippe Golle et al., Incentives for Sharing in Peer-to-Peer Networks, 2001, at 7, available in
<http://crypto.stanford.edu/~pgolle/papers/peer.pdf> (visited August 17, 2001).
76
Cf. Richard H. Thaler, Psychology and Savings Policies, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 186, 191 (1994) (noting
that inertia, loss aversion, and transaction costs cause employees to accept the default options connected to
their employers’ 401(k) plans).
77
The sample size for my study consisted of 208 unique users who downloaded MP3 files from my
hard drive during several sessions in November. For the purposes of my study, I compiled a shared
directory containing a broadly representative sample of music files—some new, some old, some desirable,
some evidently not so desirable. For each download I recorded the downloader’s user name, the file being
downloaded, the number of files being shared in his or her directory, whether the user was sharing files that
were identified as pornography or child pornography, and whether the file downloaded appeared in the
downloader’s own shared directory at the conclusion of the file transfer. There are several potential sources
of bias resulting from my methodology. First, the sample missed those users who are pure passive
uploaders—those who constantly upload but never download content from others. This group is evidently
small but not nonexistent. Cf. infra note 92. On the other hand, it is worth noting that this group will only
be somewhat underrepresented in my sample because even passive uploaders need to acquire content in
order to share content, and downloading such content from others will usually be less cumbersome than
creating it anew. Second, the sample missed those who are interested in obtaining non-music content, such
as DVD movies and pornographic images. Because of legal, logistical, and moral constraints, I did not
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songs, the equivalent of less than two typical music CDs. Just 20% of all users shared
more than 100 files each. Yet, according to a survey conducted by Edison Media
Research, 43% of file-swappers admitted downloading 100 or more files.78 So a majority
of file-swappers with large collections were evidently choosing to share only portions of
those collections. Cooperation, albeit small-scale cooperation, was therefore the norm on
MusicCity. At least part of this increased sharing, relative to Gnutella, surely stemmed
from the defaults built into these systems. That said, much of the sharing appears to be
motivated by other factors. That is because a majority of sharers evidently shared content
in a manner inconsistent with the defaults built into the MusicCity and KaZaA
applications.79 Users of MusicCity, like early users of Gnutella, therefore made conscious
decisions about whether to contribute content to anonymous others, and about the extent
of those contributions. In short, millions of users of Napster, Gnutella, Morpheus, and
other file-swapping networks made files available for download by total strangers,
notwithstanding their lack of an obvious incentive for doing so.

2.

Files Are Usually Accurately Labeled and of High Quality

It was exceptionally rare for files to be misidentified on Napster, Gnutella, and the
other file-swapping networks. A user who downloaded a file entitled “Thelonius Monk—
Straight, No Chaser,” would almost certainly obtain that tune performed by that artist. In
a few instances, musical compositions were misidentified, but without any apparent
malicious motive. For example, there was widespread confusion among users of the fileswapping networks as to who composed “The Flight of the Bumble Bee.”80 Other than
include those files in my sample directory. Third, to the extent that my music sample was unrepresentative
of the music content sought on the network, there may be a further source of bias. All three sources
introduce the potential for slight sample bias into the study, and further research will help clarify the extent
of those biases.
78
Edison Media Research, The National Record Buyers Study II § 1(2002), available in
<http://www.edisonresearch.com/R&RRecordBuyersII.htm> (visited August 3, 2002). Edison’s data is
based on a survey conducted in May of 2002, approximately six months after I collected my data. See also
Bill Husted, Music Downloads Are Going Strong Despite Napster’s Setback, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan 20,
2002, at 1P (providing anecdotal evidence suggesting that some users have enormous music collections—
numbering in the “thousands, if not tens of thousands, of songs”).
79
Thirty-two percent of users elected not to share any files, contrary to MusicCity’s defaults. Twentytwo percent of sharers opted not to pass along files they had just downloaded, behaving in a manner that is
inconsistent with the software defaults and technically difficult. Finally, it appears, based on Edison Media
Research’s survey, that at least half of the remaining sharers elected to share only a portion of their MP3
collections, which is not only inconsistent with the software’s defaults but also somewhat cumbersome. (It
is evidently common for users to move files from their shared directories to non-shared directories from
time to time, then allow increased sharing as the size of their shared directories grow with subsequent
downloads. It would have been much simpler for users to opt not to share any files, yet relatively few chose
that option.)
80
A Gnutella search reveals that approximately an equal number of “Flight of the Bumble Bee” files
identify its composer as Beethoven and Rimsky Korsakov. Rachmaninoff is the next most popular answer,
followed by Tchaikovsky, and even Mozart.
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that, the overwhelming majority of music files available on Napster, Gnutella, and hybrid
systems were accurately identified in terms of content.81
Given the amount of mischief that generally pervades the Internet,82 it is
surprising that extensive downloading revealed almost no evidence of song
misidentification on the file-swapping networks. Recall that a small percentage of the
user population is responsible for creating the files that hundreds of other users exchange
on the Internet. Further, because of the technological defaults built into the software,
many users of the hybrids automatically made available for downloading any file they
had just downloaded. My MusicCity sample revealed that 78% of sharers automatically
shared a file they have just downloaded. It follows from these premises that a small but
energetic band of downloaders could rapidly spread large numbers of maliciously
misidentified files through the Internet.
The primary organized effort to misidentify files available on file-swapping
networks has involved child pornography. The trading of child pornography on the
Internet, and especially on Gnutella, is rampant.83 One organization that was concerned
about Gnutella’s use by child pornographers adopted the file misidentification strategy,
albeit with a shame sanctions twist.84 The proprietors of the web site Zeropaid.com
posted a number of phony child pornography files on Gnutella, then recorded the IP
addresses of those who downloaded them, and posted those addresses on their web site’s
“Wall of Shame.”85 While Zeropaid.com did not take the next step of tracing those IP
addresses to particular individuals, computer users with moderate sophistication could
have done so. According to the Zeropaid.com web site, the Wall of Shame’s creators
hoped to frighten and shame those who traffic in child pornography into leaving the
81

From March to August 2001, I downloaded a large sample size of MP3 files from Napster, Gnutella
(using BearShare), and MusicCity’s Morpheus. As best I can determine, less than one-half of one percent
of these files were substantially mislabeled as to artist or title. One mild form of misidentification is
common. Pornographic files are often labeled using obvious pornographic terms, in addition to the name of
a popular artist. For example, a search for “Christina Aguilera” on Gnutella will turn up hundreds of MP3
files by that artist and a few hardcore pornographic files in which the word Aguilera is surrounded by
sexually explicit words. This method is apparently used by pornography lovers as a way of exposing their
pornographic content to a large group of potential downloaders. Of course, no one who downloads such a
file would entertain the notion that the file has even the most remote connection to Christina Aguilera. This
mislabeling therefore has little effect on trust among members.
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See, e.g., David Anderson, SETI@home, in PEER-TO-PEER, supra note 6, at 67, 72 (discussing the
SETI@home application, which allows computer users to donate their excess processing capacity to the
analysis of radio waves pursuant to the search for extraterrestrial life, and noting that a number of
participants “doctored their result files, making it appear that their computers had found a strong signal”).
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John Schwartz, File Swapping Is New Route for Pornography on Internet, N.Y. TIMES, July 28,
2001, at A1; Bob Sullivan, Gnutella Ignites Porn, Pirate Worries, April 13, 2000, available in
<http://www.zdnet.com.com/2100-11-519879.html> (visited August 9, 2002).
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On shame sanctions, see generally ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 88-111 (2000); Dan
M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. LAW. REV. 591 (1996); and James Q.
Whitman, What Is Wrong with Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1056 (1998).
85
Kan, supra note 36, at 118-19; Bob Sullivan, Gnutella Porn Surfers Exposed, May 4, 2000, available
in <http://www.zdnet.com/2100-11-520437.html> (visited August 9, 2002).
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Gnutella network. To that end, Zeropaid’s creators also distributed a program called
“Fakeroo” that would permit individual Internet users to create their own walls of
shame.86 Following Zeropaid’s lead, several other Gnutella users have discussed
intentionally mislabeling content so as to confuse and harass those using the network to
traffic in child pornography.87 Zeropaid.com’s efforts prompted a great deal of criticism
from file-swappers, both from those who believe that intentional deception is wrong even
if the goals are noble and from those who defend child pornography on the “merits.”88
Indeed, opponents of the Wall of Shame successfully ended Zeropaid.com’s experiment
with it in rather short order, as the late Gene Kan noted:
The Wall of Shame met a rapid demise in a rather curious and very
Internet way. Once news of its existence circulated on the IRC [an Internet
chatting network], Gnutella users with disruptive senses of humor flooded
the network with suggestive searches in their attempts to get their IP
addresses on the Wall of Shame.89
Zeropaid.com was therefore forced to “tear down that wall” after a brief run, although it
did leave archived versions of the Wall on its page for more than a year.
While not as rare as song misidentifications, faulty recordings also have been an
infrequent nuisance on the file-swapping networks. Some MP3 files contain incomplete
versions of songs; some MP3s are low-quality recordings; and some MP3s contain
mysterious screeches and pops that sound quite unpleasant when reproduced by computer
speakers.90 Because these flaws in MP3 files are more difficult to detect than
mislabeling,91 the existence of large numbers of flawed copies would quickly erode the
trust that has developed on the file-swapping networks.
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Fakeroo, available in <http:/www.zeropaid.com/busted/fake.php> (visited Aug. 8, 2001).
For an extended discussion, see
http://www.gnutellaforums.com/showthread.php?s=18602f5a72f0507e902dc801c84ba751&threadid=1
988 (visited August 1, 2001).
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See generally Zeropaid.com User Forum, available in <http://www.zeropaid.com/cgibin/ub/UltraBoard.pl?Action=ShowBoard&Board=TheWall&Idle=&Sort=&Order=&Session=> (visited
Aug. 6, 2001).
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Kan, supra note 36, at 119.
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Approximately one and a half percent of the MP3 files in the sample I downloaded were significantly
flawed. Most of these songs were incomplete, and a few songs contained harsh and mysterious noises.
91
Mislabeling could ordinarily be detected within a note or two, so a user who played a song on his
computer before burning it onto his CD would likely delete the mislabeled version and try to find a
properly labeled version. By contrast, a degraded version of a song that skips or cuts off early might not be
detected by a user until it is burned onto a CD and listened to in its entirety. At that point, the user generally
will not be able to erase the flawed file, and will need to endure the imperfect version or burn a new CD.
87
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3.

A Failure of Cooperation: Transmission Disruptions Are Frequent

Obtaining files via a file-swapping network is necessarily a two-way street. Thus,
every file I download is being supplied by another user somewhere. The nature of the
transaction is such that it can be terminated by either user. It appears that a few fileswappers leave their computers running file-swapping software indefinitely, either by
default or intentionally, and allow others to download their files twenty-four hours a
day.92 But most users make their files available for downloading only while they
themselves are searching for new files. If these users behave self-interestedly, one would
expect that they would regularly log off their networks regardless of whether anyone is in
the midst of a lengthy download. As it happens, download cutoffs were one of the more
vexing problems on the Napster and Gnutella networks.93 A user downloading a large file
—such as a DVD movie or a complete album fused into a single MP3 file—had no better
than a 50% chance of succeeding if the download would require more than a few hours.
Some portion of these interruptions could be attributed to network errors or failures, but a
significant number can be attributed to users shutting down their computers while an
upload is in progress.94
There was an aspirational norm95 on the Napster and Gnutella networks holding
that it is improper to log off the system while someone else is downloading a file from
you. This rule was announced both through the software itself, which discourages such
behavior with various warnings and beeps, and through general discussions of Napster
and Gnutella netiquette.96 Some users apparently felt pangs of guilt when they logged off
the network while a download was in progress.97
Efforts to secure widespread compliance with the aspirational anti-termination
norm on Gnutella faced a particular disadvantage: the low likelihood of repeat-player
situations. Gnutella’s public network consists of a series of networks. Each time a user
accesses Gnutella, he likely connects to a different segment of the network and is linked
with completely different users. Indeed, two computers connecting to the Internet from
92
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the same residence will probably log into different, essentially unlinked parts of the
Gnutella network. In a close-knit group it would be relatively easy for a user to retaliate
against one who had terminated in the midst of a transmission by doing the same to
him—the venerable tit-for-tat strategy.98 In an environment characterized by anonymity
and a lack of opportunities for repeat playing, chances for payback against a user who has
just logged off will be rare.99
The prevalence of transmission terminations suggests that the Napster and
Gnutella networks’ ability to foster trust and benevolence among users ran up against
certain limits. While a user may have believed it was “wrong” to shut down his computer
while someone else was downloading a large file, he did so anyway if the alternative was
to keep his computer running unnecessarily overnight. Download terminations were
particularly irritating to three groups: (1) those who had slow Internet connections; (2)
those who downloaded large files; and (3) those who were in the process of downloading
difficult-to-find files that cannot be downloaded readily from other users. In short, the
aspirational anti-termination norm turned out to be largely ignored in practice.
As a result of the inability of informal norms to solve the termination problem,
computer programmers turned to a technological fix. The new Gnutella and hybrid fileswapping programs contain features designed to minimize the termination problem by
permitting simultaneous downloads of the same file from different users. Assuming that
all users remain connected throughout the download, the software will download a
portion of the file from each. If one user disconnects during the download, the other
uploaders will automatically pick up the slack. Moreover, the hybrids generally permit
users to continue aborted downloads in progress. Thus, technology created a safety net
when uncooperative behavior was too prevalent on the networks.

II.

File-Swapping Norms

Widespread copyright infringement is nothing new. For years, users of
copyrighted software have exchanged unlicensed copies with family members and
colleagues. Audio cassettes have long been used to make copies of entire music CDs,
which have been distributed among friends. Choirs copy sheet music and perform songs
without ever thinking about obtaining public performance rights through legitimate
channels. As these behaviors suggest, copyright laws were frequently ignored among
members of close-knit groups. While making a copy of an album or reading available to a
friend may have been unlawful, there was no social norm constraining such de minimis
98
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infringement behavior. As a result, the copyright laws were largely irrelevant, at least
among certain close-knit groups of individual actors.
Napster and its successors advanced a new norm. Napster empowered the
individual computer users to obtain sound recordings, not only from friends, family
members, and co-workers, but from anonymous individuals who they had never met and
never would meet. It facilitated peer-to-peer file transfers among computer users on
different continents. The relevant universe of potential transaction partners for copyright
infringers was expanded to unprecedented levels.100 An individual, aided by this
technology, could easily engage in de maximus copyright infringement without ever
leaving his home.
Whereas popular norms during the 1980s likely would have tolerated an
individual’s making a copy of the Pacman game for a trusted acquaintance, they would
not have tolerated that same individual’s making hundreds of unauthorized copies of
Pacman and distributing them to strangers across the globe.101 Yet that is precisely what
a Gnutella user does by making such files available for others to download. The transition
from de minimis to de maximus file-sharing has significantly weakened reverence for
intellectual property rights, even relative to where it stood a decade or two ago.102 The
100
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file-swapping networks therefore represent a particularly brazen and successful attack on
intellectual property rights.
The simple account of how the types of transactions that Napster facilitated
became socially acceptable attributes it entirely to the emergence of the new technology.
On this account, the absence of an anti-de minimis-infringement norm was a function of
transaction costs. Small-scale infringement was relatively inexpensive for the individual
infringer, and evidently did little to harm copyright holders’ bottom lines. Indeed, under
certain conditions, sharing among members of a close-knit group may have increased
copyright holders’ profits.103 Large scale infringement was different in two ways. First, it
required significant investments in technology for duplicating digital media. Second, and
relatedly, it had the potential to adversely effect copyright holders’ profits in obvious
ways. Thus, a large-scale infringer was someone who had invested a not-insignificant
amount of resources in expanding his capacity to infringe, presumably in order to recover
not-insignificant amounts of revenue at the copyright holders’ expense. Napster
dramatically lowered the transaction costs of becoming a large-scale infringer and
removed the necessary implication that a large-scale infringer was trying to profit
personally from her activities.104 In short, large-scale Napster sharers looked more like
altruists than thieves, and no longer deserved the scorn that had previously been reserved
for those who sold knock-off CDs on street corners. In my view, though, this
technological shift was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the norm shift that
followed. A complete explanation requires at least some examination of the role played
by the media and other opinion leaders in promoting Napster.
A.

The Social Norms Framework: The Emergence of Norms

Social norms are patterns of behavior that are widely adhered to by some group of
individuals, at least in part because of social pressures to conform to that norm.105 In
close-knit settings, this social pressure may take the form of ostracism or the loss of
esteem for those who violate existing social norms and increased esteem for those who
statement, as did 59% of those aged 18-24. Yet only 45% of those aged 25 to 34 and 39% of those aged 35
to 44 agreed with the statement. Edison Media Research, supra note 78, at § 1. While a change in norms is
the most plausible account for these differential polling results, it is also conceivable that older respondents
are naturally more skeptical of technologies that challenge existing property regimes or that older
respondents have a more informed understanding of the justification for providing record labels with a
revenue stream through album sales. The passage of time will resolve this question, as pollsters will have
an opportunity to examine whether today’s youthful cohorts carry their pro-file-swapping views with them
into middle age.
103
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enforce or abide by these norms (the Richard McAdams theory), or a desire to obtain the
economic rewards that are conferred upon those who signal their suitability for
cooperative exchanges by enforcing or abiding by existing norms (the Eric Posner
theory).106 Alternatively, as I will argue in Section III.C.5, the social pressure
engendering norm enforcement can be self-imposed: An individual may conform to a
norm because her self esteem depends on her compliance with it. Regardless of how they
arise, social norms often will have two components: moral (how people ought to behave)
and descriptive (how people do behave).107
Three related insights are foundational in the social norms literature. First,
people’s behavior often conforms more closely with social norms regarding how people
should behave than with laws that instruct people how to behave.108 Second, because of
the power of social norms, those laws that parallel social norms will be adhered to most
widely and enforced most easily.109 Third, under certain conditions, government laws and
policies can alter social norms.110

B.

How the Pro-File-Swapping Norms Emerged
1.

Norm Entrepreneurs

In the case of Napster and Gnutella, norm entrepreneurs played an important role
in fostering the emerging pro-file-swapping norms. Napster’s norm entrepreneurs were
the handful of programmers who created the new network and the people who uploaded
the initial copyrighted content, many of whom were friends or acquaintances of Napster’s
primary programmer.111 This group consisted of slightly more than 30 people.112 Yet
106
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within a matter of days, the on-line word-of-mouth had spread news of the new
application, and Napster was downloaded by 3,000 to 4,000 people.113
Napster’s primary creator evidently did not give any thought to whether his
network would be unlawful before he launched it.114 Yet he plainly intended to deprive
the recording industry of its control over access to and distribution of sound
recordings.115 The words and actions of these norm entrepreneurs were suggesting that it
was acceptable for computer users to exchange copyrighted sound recordings in the MP3
format over the Internet. One message communicated by these actions was that copyright
laws should have no application on the Internet. A second message implied that
regardless of what the copyright laws said, technological imperatives and consumer
demand would trump legal niceties.

2.

Opinion Leaders

During Napster’s first year of existence, a year in which its user base expanded
from 30 to more than 25 million,116 Napster received surprisingly little attention from
mainstream media opinion leaders. Napster’s test version was launched on June 1, 1999,
and by October of that year, Napster traffic was accounting for 20 to 30% of the
bandwidth usage at major universities,117 yet during the remainder of the calendar year it
was virtually ignored by mainstream media. A two-sentence blurb in the Newsbytes wire
service appeared on July 23, 1999, touting Napster as a useful new application for
obtaining MP3 files.118 Radio silence persisted again until November 2, 2000, when the
of various file transfer protocols, the spread of high-speed Internet access, and the creation of the MP3
format for compressing sound recordings. Baker, supra note 8, at 6; Sheldon W. Halpern, The Digital
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giving away information at no charge - -what might be called the ‘Netscape strategy’—as a means of
building up reputational capital that can be subsequently be converted into income (for example, by means
of the sale of services).”). The theory behind this business model was that giving away content would allow
applications to gain market share and that this market share could later be exploited to generate revenue
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Israeli newspaper Ha’Aretz featured a brief description of the Napster service.119 It was
not until the Recording Industry Association of American (“RIAA”) sued Napster that the
major media outlets began to take notice of the growing phenomenon. Salon.com appears
to have scooped the news regarding the impending lawsuit on November 17, 1999,120 and
within a few weeks the Wall Street Journal began to cover the story.121 Over the next
year, Napster became the subject of thousands of mainstream news articles.
During these first few months, when Napster went from being a college student’s
idea to a copyright-infringement juggernaut, there was a dearth of commentary from
opinion leaders122 on the phenomenon. It is unclear why Napster received so little
coverage during its infancy. Major media outlets may have made a conscious decision not
to encourage the popularity of the service by reporting on it. More likely, however, the
major media simply missed the story.
If the mainstream media abdicated their role as opinion leaders, who stepped into
the opinion vacuum? In this instance, the primary answer appears to be mostly
anonymous Internet users who felt the need to spread the gospel of Napster. For example,
computer programmer David de Groot claims to have been the original uploader of
Napster to download.com, which is the Internet’s premier source of downloadable
software applications.123 Download.com contains a system of “user ratings” whereby
those who download an application rank it according to various criteria, provide a
narrative discussing what they like or do not like about the application, and provide an
overall “thumbs up” or “thumbs down” assessment of the new product. Napster
immediately received enthusiastic responses from those who had downloaded it, and this
positive word of mouth spurred a cascade of further downloading. In the absence of
commentary from trusted opinion leaders, these untrusted opinion leaders were able to
embrace and spread the emerging norm. Other venues, such as college dormitories124 and
Internet chat rooms provided alternative channels for enthusiastic Napster users to spread
their message.
That is not to say that mainstream opinion leaders played no role in the growth of
the file-swapping norm. When the major media finally began reporting on the story,
119

Zvika Alberger, Cutting the Chords: MP3 Has Replaced Sex as the Biggest Thing on the Internet,
HA’ARETZ, Nov. 2, 1999.
120
Janelle Brown, MP3 Crackdown, Nov. 17, 1999, available in
<http://www.salon.com/tech/log/1999/11/17/riaa/index.html> (visited August 19, 2001).
121
Don Clark, Recording Industry Sues Napster, Alleging Copyright Infringement, WALL STREET J.,
Dec. 9, 1999, at B18.
122
For a discussion of the role that opinion leaders generally play in transforming norms, see Robert C.
Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L & ECON. REV. 1, 16 (2001).
123
David de Groot, Napster: A History, Dec. 21, 2000, available in <http://epinions.com/cmd-review38E8-2919A149-3A426109-prod2?sp=ink> (visited August 3, 2001).
124
Napster Users Majority on Campus, May 15, 2000, available in
<http:/www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,36354,00.html> (visited May 13, 2001).

27

many gave credence to Napster’s argument that the legality of the file-swapping service
was a “gray area” of the law.125 By repeating the tenuous proposition that Napster (and,
by extension, its users) were not guilty of copyright infringement, these opinion leaders
emboldened users who were tempted to use the new application. If the program provided
a user-friendly way to access an enormous library of free sound recordings, if its legality
was unclear, and if copyright holders were unable to convince the public that
downloading copyrighted content for free was wrong, then why should any computer
user decide not to use the application?
In the months following the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Napster, opinion leaders
showed little sign of changing their tune in an effort to undermine file-swapping. Perhaps
the most telling sign of the emerging consensus appeared in a front-page New York Times
article on July 20, 2001.126 The subject matter of the article was rather unremarkable, in
that it reported on the phenomenon whereby users had moved from Napster to Gnutella
and the hybrids in the wake of the court-imposed restrictions on Napster. The surprising
aspect of the article was the rather detailed instructions it contained explaining how to
obtain these file-swapping programs.127 Thus, the most respected newspaper in the
United States, owned by a corporation whose profits are largely derived from its
copyrighted content, had essentially concluded that the public had a right to know how to
obtain unauthorized copies of copyrighted sound recordings and motion pictures. Months
after the Ninth Circuit’s Napster decision, when the legality of such downloading was no
longer subject to serious dispute, the New York Times implicitly acknowledged that
unlawful downloading would remain alive and well. Within a week, other major
newspapers were following suit, with the Orlando Sentinel publishing a lengthy review
of the various Napster alternatives and comparing the advantages and disadvantages of
each one.128

3.

Polling data

The Napster district court concluded that Napster’s exploits had “contributed to a
new attitude that digitally-downloaded songs ought to be free.”129 In order to test that
125
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conclusion, it is necessary to look at the polling that has been done with respect to the
perceived morality of Napster’s services. A number of public opinion polls have gauged
Americans’ views toward the unauthorized downloading of copyrighted sound
recordings. The most rigorous and informative of these polls have been conducted by the
Pew Internet and American Life Project. According to a Pew poll taken during mid-2000,
78% of those Internet users who had downloaded music from the Internet stated that they
did not consider themselves to be “stealing” the music.130 Among all Americans,
however, 40% stated that those who downloaded music off the Internet for free were
doing nothing wrong; 35% believed that the practice amounted to stealing; and 30%
would not address the propriety of such activities or gave inconsistent answers.131
The Pew Internet project has not released any follow-up polling data to test the
influence that the Ninth Circuit’s Napster decision has had on public attitudes. A public
opinion poll conducted in the summer of 2002, however, more than one year after the
Napster decision was handed down, revealed an evenly divided populace, with 52% of
those polled agreeing that “there is nothing morally wrong about downloading music for
free from the Internet” and 48% disagreeing with the statement.132
As these numbers indicate, a significant portion of the American public believes
that those users who download copyrighted content without paying for it are behaving
immorally. Yet these individuals do not perceive themselves as having any personal stake
in enforcing the norm. Those who feel file-swapping is immoral are unlikely to be
130
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exposed to the activities of file-swappers, since much of this activity occurs in the
privacy of file-swappers’ homes. Moreover, it is not at all clear that those who believe
file-swapping is immoral feel strongly enough about the issue to impose social sanctions
on file-swappers.

a.

Norm Enforcement—Anti-File-Swapping

While almost half of the American public believes that downloading copyrighted
sound recordings from Napster, Gnutella, or the hybrids is morally wrong, there has been
virtually no effort to use that sentiment to enforce laws against unauthorized
downloading. Members of the public have been unwilling to do anything to combat the
problem, notwithstanding their view that it amounts to theft. Nor has any noticeable
social disapproval been directed at the millions of “thieves” who are stealing copyrighted
content. File-swapping may well be like speeding on the freeway, a widely tolerated,
technical violation of a rule that invokes virtually no moral outrage when done in
moderation.133
Young people lend homemade CDs containing illicitly copied MP3 files to
friends. Known downloaders are not shunned, blackballed, or otherwise subjected to any
kind of social sanction. While individuals who download child pornography off Gnutella
have been subjected to minor shame sanctions,134 no one has ever thought to do the same
to the millions of individuals who are downloading copyrighted content off the same
network. It is widely believed that the public could not stomach widespread prosecutions
of individual computer users who had illicitly downloaded copyrighted content.135 As
Robert Litan concludes, “it is highly doubtful that Americans would tolerate for very
long, if at all, the police raiding homes and arresting teenagers for copying music or
movies.”136 Although a large segment of society may believe that unauthorized
downloading of copyrighted content is immoral, virtually no one in society believes in
these principles strongly enough to enforce an anti-file-swapping norm. The only
Americans who appear to have particularly strong feelings about the morality of fileswapping are the file-swappers themselves and the creators of copyrighted content.
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Because there are a great number of the former and very few of the latter, informal
enforcement of the private property norm has been almost nonexistent.

b.

Norm Enforcement—Pro-File-Swapping

Norm enforcement among the pro-file-swapping portion of society is easier to
detect. Among those Americans who have never downloaded music from the Internet,
there are virtually no signs of pro-file-swapping norm enforcement activities. The most
significant exception is the celebrity status that has been conferred upon Napster’s
founder, Shawn Fanning. As one author noted, using only a bit of hyperbole, “Fanning
had been on more magazine covers than anyone since John F. Kennedy.”137 A gushing
Time Magazine profile of Fanning summarized his status thusly:
As the creator of Napster, Fanning has reached a level of fame
unprecedented for a 19-year-old who is neither a sports hero nor a pop
star. He’s been on the cover of Fortune, BusinessWeek, Forbes, and the
Industry Standard and has been profiled just about everywhere else. His
name and his face—those piercing blue eyes, wide cheeks and stolid
expression under the ever present University of Michigan baseball cap—
have become synonymous with the promise of the Internet to empower
computer users and the possibility that some kiddie-punk programmer will
destroy entire industries. Strangers pick him out at the mall buying a
burrito or watching a San Francisco Giants game or just driving around in
his newly customized Mazda RX-7. He introduced Britney Spears at the
MTV Video Music Awards. Nike has offered him a shoe deal.138
Fanning has garnered enormous social benefits as a result of his change agent activities.
By valorizing him, the public encouraged the millions of teenagers who follow in his
(Nike-imprinted) footsteps and contribute content to his network.
The creators of the Gnutella network have not achieved the same level of fame as
Fanning. That is not to say that their acts have gone unrewarded in terms of social
benefits. Those programmers who created successful peer-to-peer networks or who
solved technical problems that arose on the existing networks obtained the significant
esteem of their peers. As Stephen McJohn has noted in the context of open source139
programmers:
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Many open source authors are spurred to create code by incentives other
than copyright: the love of elegant problem solving (a.k.a. hacking), status
among peers, the wish to further computer science and make things better
generally, and even animosity toward software developers. . . . Looking
only to material considerations, open source developers might appear to be
acting contrary to rational economic incentives, by giving away software.
However, when one considers the return in terms of increased status
among software developing peers (i.e., showing off technical prowess, or
receiving approval for participating in the open source movement, or
building relationships in the development process), ample incentives
become apparent.140
It is this desire for the support of one’s peers that is particularly important in helping to
craft subgroup norms.141
In order to understand the widespread popularity of downloading music files, one
needs to understand both the ways in which Napster lowered the transaction costs of
copyright infringement and the reasons why copyright laws had created strong antiinfringement norms among members of the public. It is now appropriate to turn to the
much more interesting half of the file-swapping equation: uploading.

III.

Charismatic Code and Cooperative Norms in Loose-Knit Groups

So far, my account of the file-swapping networks has focused predominantly on
the downloading aspect of the file-swapping transactions. It has explained how
downloading files from these networks became socially acceptable, and why a
downloader of unlicensed copies of copyrighted content was likely to encounter few if
any social sanctions from those individuals who were exposed to the real-world
manifestations of this online behavior.
Although this account talks of norm transformations in society at large, the social
norms theories built upon discussions of how norms emerge and evolve within close-knit
groups are still pertinent. Hence potential file-swappers respond to behavioral
environments in their dormitories, high school cafeterias, workplaces, and living rooms,
and those environments partially reflect the norms that are conveyed through the mass
media. Societal norms may be the mere aggregation of the norms that emerge from a
multitude of overlapping close-knit groups.
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Where downloading from the network is easy, and provides significant benefits at
low costs, little need be done to convince people to use these networks to download
content. All that is required are relatively weak norms against those who acquire
copyrighted content through unlawful channels, and the attractions of participating in the
network will convince many users to ignore copyright law. The fact that file-swapping
change agents such as Shawn Fanning and Justin Frankel are valorized adds fuel to the
fire. Downloading is attractive; downloading is acceptable within the relevant peer
groups; and downloading is cool. So what if it’s illegal? Such thinking has driven onehalf of the file-swapping revolution.
A robust account of these networks also requires one to consider the more
interesting half of the equation—the puzzle of why so many of the networks’ users
choose to share their content with others despite the absence of obvious incentives for
doing so. After all, if no one—or very few people—contributed content to the networks,
then the networks would become an unattractive source for copyrighted content and they
would lose much of their usership base.
A.

Charismatic Code Defined

Virtually everyone who participates in one of the file-swapping networks is
breaking the law in the process. Ordinarily, people are unlikely to trust law-breakers,
especially anonymous lawbreakers. Yet a remarkable sense of trust permeates these
networks. As was suggested in Part I, it is possible to observe significant levels of
cooperative behavior, very little by way of destructive behavior, and substantial trust
among the anonymous users of these networks. Furthermore, the networks have survived
and thrived largely because of their users’ dogged willingness to engage in unlawful
activities. While the cost of sharing is quite low for those sharing music files via highspeed Internet connections, the cost is much higher for their modem-using brethren. Yet
those with slower connections appear to share content at substantially the same (relatively
high) rates.142 Moreover, thousands incur a serious risk of severe criminal penalties by
uploading pornography (including child pornography) to strangers.143 What on earth
causes people to behave in such a manner?
I will argue that the primary answer to that question is “charismatic code,” a
technology that presents each member of a community with a distorted picture of his
fellow community members by magnifying cooperative behavior and masking
uncooperative behavior. I will then suggest that charismatic code is particularly potent in
this case because it successfully taps into internalized and nearly universal norms of
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reciprocity.144 The various applications are all cleverly designed to encourage
cooperation by as many users as possible. In one sense, the applications harness the
actual members of the community to become actors and enforcers for norm enforcement
purposes, magnifying the actions of those who cooperate and masking the actions of
those who do not. In another sense, the applications “substitute” for the community of
actors and enforcers, inculcating in their users those norms most likely to lead to the
success and expansion of the networks. Finally, the applications’ architecture underscores
the reciprocity on which the success of the file-swapping networks depend.

B.

The Distorted Image

I earlier mentioned that only about one-third of all users of the Gnutella network
apparently make any of their content available for downloading by others. The creators of
the Gnutella network know this, and yet they say it isn’t so. One of the first images a new
Gnutella user was likely to encounter upon installing the software for the first time and
learning how it works is a screen entitled “What Is Gnutella?” That screen falsely told
users: “The other half of Gnutella is giving back. Almost everyone on GnutellaNet shares
their stuff.”145 Now, there is nothing terribly persuasive about telling a lie per se, but the
genius of Gnutella is the way in which it makes that lie look like a reality to its users. As
we shall see, if that lie is made persuasive enough, it can develop into a self-fulfilling
prophecy.
Gnutella’s creators have attempted to situate its users in an environment that
makes it appear as if there really is a norm of sharing and cooperation on the network.
Charismatic code is the primary tool in that effort. Because of the way the networks are
structured, the actions of those who share content are quite visible146 while the actions of
144
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those who do not share content are virtually invisible.147 Particularly if a user is searching
for content by a particularly popular artist, she will have no trouble locating scores of
other users who have made that artist’s work available. Users who share no files, on the
other hand, do not appear in response to user searches, so other users generally will have
a very difficult time perceiving their participation in the networks. The architecture of the
networks is such that although many users on the networks do not share, the networks
create an appearance that sharing is the norm. This dynamic—the magnified visibility of
sharers and the invisibility of non-sharers—exists on virtually every successful fileswapping application.
Some of the networks are careful to present data that reinforces this image of
widespread file sharing. For example, the MusicCity Morpheus application displays in a
prominent location the total number of users logged into the network at a given time and
the aggregate number of files being shared.148 These statistics not only punctuate the
ubiquity of usership, but they also imply the widespread prevalence of file-sharing, since
the mean number of files shared per user consistently exceeds one hundred while the
median number of files shared is less than twenty. By providing only the raw data used to
calculate the mean, the network masks the fact that a fifth of all users are providing the
vast majority of the content that is available for downloading.149
The applications provide information not only about the prevalence of fileswappers, but also reveal some useful information about their users’ preferences. The
file-swapping networks bring together file-swappers with similar tastes in copyrighted
content, thereby convincing new users that people just like them are members of the fileswapping community. The software is designed to underscore affinities among uploaders
and downloaders, and to create empathy among anonymous users. So while users
exchanging files on the file-swapping networks are anonymous, their preferences are not.
When I search for music by the Cameroonian vocalist Henri Dikongue, I am necessarily
searching for users who, like me, enjoy that artist’s work. While these commonalities
may be more meaningful to users who are interested in relatively obscure artists like
the extent of criminal behavior, are different from other forms of criminality on the Internet. See generally
Katyal, supra note 108, at 1109 (“[U]nlike crimes in realspace, those in cyberspace are almost always
invisible. There are no bars on the windows to glimpse and no loiterers and panhandlers to avoid.”). The
important exception arises in college dormitories, where students have little privacy and so file-sharing may
be quite visible, even in real space.
147
Gnutella applications do not allow a user to locate non-sharers on the network—they are essentially
invisible. On MusicCity / KaZaA, non-sharers are exceedingly well camouflaged. In order to locate nonsharers on these networks, a user has to make content available for downloading, wait for users to
download his content, and then peek at the downloaders’ shared directories during the transfer of shortly
thereafter to determine whether that user is sharing any files. That is the methodology I have employed in
my study of the MusicCity network, and I can testify to its cumbersome and tedious nature.
148
This statistic apparently includes the number of non-unique files being shared. So a thousand
identical copies of Piano Man would be counted as a thousand files being shared, not one file being shared.
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Dikongue, this affinity effect cannot be discounted in building trust within a community
of anonymous users.150 By the same token, these affinities normalize file-swapping:
Members of the file-swapping networks stop being identified as “rogue software pirates”
and start being identified as “people who, like me, have excellent musical taste.”
As it happens, the file-swapping networks also provide avenues for those
particularly committed to the community of file-swappers to express themselves and their
views. The file-swapping networks generally contain fora and “Frequently Asked
Questions” postings that provide the curious user with assistance in optimizing his use of
the network. A survey of postings in the fora reveals that the individuals who respond to
user queries in these discussion groups tend to be those who are most committed to the
success of the network and, not coincidentally, tend to be the most dogmatic supporters
of file-swapping norms. In these fora, there is a significant disconnect between those
most likely to post questions and those most likely to answer those questions. The
questioners will by and large be new users who have not figured out how to optimize
their use of the file-swapping networks. The answerers will be those repeat players who
have successfully figured out these problems and care enough about the newer users to
take the time to read and respond to their postings. The question and answer forums
therefore provide an excellent avenue for the old-timers (i.e., those most committed to the
norm of sharing) to inculcate their norms in the newest users.
It is worth noting further that these file-swapping network forums contain very
little by way of dissent with respect to either the propriety of file-swapping or the
necessity of file-sharing. While the file-swapping networks all contain chat rooms and
discussion fora, the number of people who join MusicCity for the chat rooms and
discussion fora is approximately equal to the number who read The Economist for the
photographs. Quite simply, only people looking for copyrighted content will go through
the trouble of running a MusicCity host. Because of this homogeneity, dissenting views
regarding the propriety of their collective activity are almost never voiced.151 Despite the
150
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fact that anyone can log onto the networks, and that free speech is generally encouraged,
opinions expressed in the chat groups and fora associated with file-swapping applications
reveal almost total adherence to the “information wants to be free” orthodoxy. Similarly,
“Frequently Asked Questions” postings, which are written by the programmers who
created the networks, predictably implore users to share as many files as possible.

C.

Reinforcing Reciprocity

Technologies that magnify cooperative behavior and mask uncooperative
behavior can succeed by tapping into deeply held social norms. In this instance, the fileswapping networks have been so successful in large part because they have managed to
tap into internalized norms of reciprocity. Recall the passage from What Is Gnutella?
quoted above: “The other half of Gnutella is giving back. Almost everyone on
GnutellaNet shares their stuff.” In the previous section, I focused on the second sentence
of that excerpt, but the first sentence is also important. The other half of Gnutella is
giving back. The networks’ creators are drawing upon reciprocal intuitions that their
users are likely to possess. Once again, the software is designed to exploit those
intuitions.
Because of the peer-to-peer nature of file-swapping transactions, it should be
reasonably clear to most users of the networks that their ability to obtain content depends
on other users’ willingness to make their content available for downloading.
Nevertheless, the file-swapping applications make this relationship particularly explicit.
Several applications display a user’s downloads and uploads from a given session on the
same screen, usually with two adjacent windows.152 This juxtaposition of downloads and
uploads on the same screen cannot be altered by the user.153 Thus, to the extent that a user
downloads much more than she uploads on a given day, the application will remind her
of that imbalance visibly. This image and the running tallies that accompany it strongly
suggest that a downloader has some obligation to give something back to the networks’
members. In that subtle way, the file-swapping applications tap further into norms of
reciprocity that users bring with them to these networks.154
adopt increasingly extreme viewpoints, see Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to
Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 89 (2000).
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During 2001, several Gnutella applications introduced a new feature that is a
testament to the force behind the impulse to reciprocate. That feature allows users to
choose to share their files only with fellow users who are in turn sharing their files. It also
allows the user to specify the number of files that another user must be sharing in order to
gain access to the files in one’s shared directory. Thus, a user can elect to share his own
files only with those users who have at least one hundred files in their respective shared
directories. This innovation has the potential to constrain the network’s growth since it
means that brand new users (who will likely have few or no files available for sharing)
could have a much harder time locating desirable content. Its introduction also implicitly
concedes that not everyone on GnutellaNet really is sharing their stuff, thereby
potentially weakening the charismatic nature of Gnutella’s code. In order to justify
introducing this option, the network’s creators must have been motivated by powerful
countervailing intuitions: (1) the instinct that users do care with whom they are sharing
their files; and (2) the insight that making this option available is likely to convince many
of the network’s free riders to begin sharing their files. In short, Gnutella programmers
may have looked at the Adar and Huberman study and concluded that norms and
charismatic code were producing a suboptimal level of cooperation on Gnutella, and that
an appeal to self-interest would bring enough free-riders into the uploading fold to justify
the real costs of introducing this innovation. It is so far difficult to gauge what effect this
innovation is having on the Gnutella network, but my analysis predicts that the option of
sharing only with other sharers will prove to be a popular one.
Rhetoric matters too. Although the file-swapping networks encourage unlawful
copyright infringement, the networks by no means cede the moral high ground. In the
parlance of the file-swapping networks, those who infringe copyrights employ the
language of reciprocity. “Freeloaders” are not those who download copyrighted content
without paying for it, but those who download content without uploading content to other
users.155 Behaviors such as making content that one has downloaded available to other
downloaders and labeling content accurately are consistent with a broader societal norm

Freedman & David Molnar, Accountability, in PEER-TO-PEER, supra note 6, at 271, 307 (“In the bulletin
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they consumed scarce system resources (remember, when one user was on via a phone line, no one else
could log in) without giving anything in return.”). Some bulletin board systems required users to maintain a
set ratio of uploads to downloads if they wished to continue to enjoy the “privilege” of downloading.
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See, e.g., Options for Freeloading Prevention?, available in
<http:/www.gnutellaforums.com/showthreat.php?threaded=12038> (visited Aug. 8, 2002); Stop
Freeloading, available in <http:/www.gnutellaforums.com/showthreat.php?threaded=9558> (visited Aug.
8, 2002). Those who favor strong intellectual property protections are more likely to use such a term to
refer to those users who are distributing content for which they have not paid. See, e.g., Trotter Hardy,
Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217, 220 (1996).
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of reciprocity—the golden rule.156 As I will argue below, because reciprocity is so
strongly inculcated in most members of society, file-sharing norms can piggyback on that
meta-norm.157
The file-swapping networks therefore are designed to reinforce the two messages
conveyed in the What Is Gnutella? excerpt: “The other half of Gnutella is giving back.
Almost everyone on GnutellaNet shares their stuff.” Translation: Those who download
should also upload; and virtually everyone on the networks uploads. The surprisingly
high levels of sharing observed on these networks is a testament to the subtle ways in
which these online spaces have been designed to reinforce that message. Relatively large
numbers of file-swappers, and in some instances a majority, have been persuaded that
they ought to make some of their content available to strangers. Yet so far an important
premise has gone unstated. There is an intuitive connection between the two sentences
quoted above. If everyone else is sharing, and if I am benefiting from their sharing, then
refusing to share does seem particularly problematic. But in an environment where an
individual will suffer no external sanctions if she chooses not to share and can fully
harness the benefit of others’ cooperation without sharing, how come that connection
arises? Put another way, the file-swapping networks’ charismatic code is working, but
why?158

D.

The Norm of Reciprocity in Loose-Knit Groups

The existing literature on social norms does a fine job of explaining the
emergence of social norms among close-knit groups. Close-knit groups analysis sheds
light on the process by which file-swapping’s visible manifestations are becoming
socially acceptable, and we can tell a plausible story about how social pressures might
spur file-swapping behaviors using either Richard McAdams’s esteem theory or Eric
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Posner’s signaling theory.159 Thus, there is little mystery about how the mass media’s
glorification of Shawn Fanning might be related to the social acceptability of college
students trading homemade CDs consisting of unlicensed sound recordings or co-workers
discussing the songs they have acquired via Gnutella. Social norms therefore provide
satisfactory tools to explain the apparent growing acceptability of file-swapping’s
manifestations in real space.160
Social norms theory, so useful in real space, encounters difficulties in cyberspace,
however. Neither McAdams’s nor Posner’s theory can adequately explain the emergence
of cooperation among the loose-knit community of users on the file-swapping
networks.161 Specifically, none of these theories can explain why almost everyone on the
159
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networks doesn’t choose to free-ride. Although the cost of sharing music is in some
instances high, sharing is never costless, and a user can download as much free music as
she wants without sharing, sharing behavior still emerges among a significant portion of
the network’s users. Moreover, even where the cost of sharing is relatively high—for
example among users who have slow Internet connections or those users who share
pornographic content—file-sharing levels remain impressive. In an environment
characterized by user anonymity and a low likelihood of repeat-player interactions,
neither esteem theory nor signaling can explain this behavioral regularity.162 Classical
economics is also at a loss.163
environments in which social norms as such do not arise. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Social Norms and Economic
Theory, 4 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 99, 100 (1989) (“[S]ocial norms differ from private norms, the selfimposed rules that people construct to overcome weakness of will. Private norms, like social norms, are
non-outcome-oriented and sustained by feelings of anxiety and guilt. They are not, however, sustained by
the approval and disapproval of others since they are not, or not necessarily, shared with others.”). I
disagree with such a characterization. My argument is that members of the loose-knit file-swapping
networks cooperate with each other largely because the networks’ creators give their users a distorted
picture of the community, and present their community in a manner likely to harness deeply engrained
norms of reciprocity. Those norms are private in the sense that they are internally enforced—through fileswappers’ desire to avoid feelings of guilt and selfishness and to experience the warm glow associated with
group solidarity. While these norms are enforced and internalized differently from social norms in closeknit groups, they are no less powerful, and they are by no means non-social.
162
Indeed, one study of the prevalence of altruistic acts found that in the pre-Napster world, helping
strangers was the exception, rather than the rule. Paul R. Amato, Personality and Social Network
Involvement as Predictors of Helping Behavior in Everyday Life, 53 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 31, 34 (1990)
(“Overall it is apparent that most of the helping was provided to familiar others; complete strangers
accounted respectively for only 11 percent and 9 percent of the helping behaviors reported by students and
nonstudents.”). That was true even though the study included as “helping” such low-cost steps as opening a
door for someone who has his hands full, giving the time of day to someone, or holding an elevator door
open for someone who wanted to get inside it before the doors closed. Id. at 41-42. Social psychologists
also argue that the motivations for and impediments to seeking help from strangers are quite different from
those involved with seeking help from friends or family members. E. Gary Shapiro, Is Seeking Help from a
Friend Like Seeking Help from a Stranger?, 43 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 259, 262 (1980).
163
Robert Sugden, Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods Through Voluntary Contributions, 94
ECON. J. 772, 773-74 (1984). Richard Thaler’s work in behavioral economics has focused on identifying
situations in which people cooperate but lack an obvious self-interested reason for doing so. Thaler and
Robyn Dawes identify several instances in which people behave altruistically even though their essential
anonymity would allow them to free ride without suffering any social sanctions. “Public television
successfully raises enough money from viewers to continue to broadcast. The United Way and other
charities receive contributions from many if not most citizens. Even when dining at a restaurant away from
home in a place never likely to be visited again, most patrons tip the server.” Robyn M. Dawes & Richard
H. Thaler, Anomalies: Cooperation, 2 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 187, 188 (1988). These instances are
interesting, but the case of file-sharing is perhaps even more puzzling. After all, one common thread for
PBS, the United Way, and restaurant waiters is that they need money, probably more than the donor needs
money. PBS’s annual struggle to meet its budget is well-documented in their pledge campaigns; the United
Way provides funding to organizations who seek to accomplish good works and help those most in need;
and waiters and waitresses are generally poorer than their customers, and it is widely understood that they
“live off” their tips. Similarly, the recipients of blood donations all need blood. From these examples,
sociologists have generalized that altruism is largely dependent on the recipient’s need for assistance. See
generally C. Daniel Batson, Prosocial Motivations: Is It Ever Truly Altruistic?, 20 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 65 (1987); William Howard & William D. Crano, Effects of Sex, Conversation,
Location, and Size of Observer Group on Bystander Intervention in a High Risk Situation, 37 SOCIOMETRY
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In proposing that charismatic code accounts for the prevalence of file-sharing on
the file-swapping networks, I attempt to provide an alternative explanation for the
creation of norms in loose-knit communities. That explanation suggests that when users
are presented with an image of a community in which cooperation is magnified and
noncooperation is masked by charismatic code, users are more likely to cooperate. This
“monkey-see, monkey-do” phenomenon has intuitive appeal.164 But all that phrase does
is describe a phenomenon; it cannot explain it. For the explanation, it is necessary to turn
to the sociological and social psychology literature.
This literature discusses something called a “Norm of Reciprocity.”165 The idea is
a simple one. Under a norm of reciprocity, when A helps B, B then feels obligated to
return the favor, either by helping A, or by helping C (a third party, albeit one who shares
at least some relevant characteristic with A).166 The norm is by no means limited to three491, 504 (1974); but cf. R. Lance Shotland & Charles A. Stebbins, Emergency and Cost as Determinants of
Helping Behavior and the Slow Accumulation of Social Psychological Knowledge, 46 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 36,
38 (1983) (finding that while the recipient’s “need” for help did not affect a potential helper’s propensity to
render assistance, the potential helper was more likely to render assistance if he perceived the situation as
an emergency). When a file-sharer makes a file available to everyone on the Gnutella network, he
necessarily gives it away to both those starving students who cannot afford to purchase a licensed copy and
those middle-aged yuppies who could easily afford to buy the album but prefer to get it for free. In short, a
file-sharer’s altruism is need-neutral. File-swapping is in that sense more akin to intentionally leaving a $20
bill on the sidewalk than to donating $20 to the Salvation Army. That said, even though the contribution is
need-neutral, individual users may assume that the beneficiaries of their largesse are like themselves and,
therefore, worthy of receiving free music. See supra text accompanying note 150 (discussing affinity
effects). Indeed, where a recipient of altruistic assistance is completely anonymous, the donor may even be
inclined to imagine the recipient as particularly needy, perhaps because doing so maximizes the psychic
benefits associated with the altruistic act. J. Keith Murnighan, Jae Wook Kim & A. Richard Metzger, The
Volunteer Dilemma, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 515, 535 (1993).
164
An example with which many will be familiar illustrates that the charismatic technologies I discuss
in this article are not entirely new; they are just more sophisticated that previous versions. For example,
during the 1970s, situation comedies typically introduced “laugh tracks” into the sound tracks of their
television programs, cuing recorded laughter after every punch line. The theory was that viewers at home
would be more likely to laugh if they heard others laughing along with them. These hackneyed
technologies fell out of favor after listeners became able to discern the difference between laugh tracks and
an actual studio audience. Today, many comedy programs pay audience members to show up and provide
real laughter, albeit with much prodding from stage managers. Although the analogy is imperfect, we can
conceptualize charismatic code as an extremely sophisticated laugh track that makes the program seem
much funnier than it actually is.
165
Alvin W. Goulder, The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement, 25 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV.
161 (1960), is generally regarded as having initiated this literature. Surveying the literature, Elinor Ostrom
concludes “that humans [likely] inherit a strong capacity to learn reciprocity norms” and that “[r]eciprocity
is a basic norm taught in all societies.” Elinor Ostrom, A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice
Theory of Collective Action, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 10 (1998).
166
I borrow this definition, not from Goulder, but from Takahashi. Nobuyuki Takahashi, The
Emergence of Generalized Exchange, 105 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1105, 1108 (2000) (“Once an actor receives
resources, she is obligated to return to someone else in the future.”). Takahashi has referred to the situation
where A helps B and B helps A as “restricted exchange,” and the situation where A helps B and B helps C as
“generalized exchange.” Id. at 1106; see also Martin A. Nowak & Karl Sigmund, Evolution of Indirect
Reciprocity by Image Scoring, 393 Nature 573, 573 (1998) (presenting a model showing how generalized
exchange, which they dub “indirect reciprocity,” might arise through evolutionary processes); Theo Van
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person interactions, as scholars have begun to realize its application to much larger
groups of individuals, such as a nation’s taxpayers.167 As the authors of this literature
have recognized, the norm of reciprocity is sufficiently powerful so that the founding
members of a brand new community are likely to bring it with them into that community,
and see it potentially flourish therein.168 If the file-swapping example is illustrative, it
may also be that these reciprocity norms can even help cause people to engage in
cooperative behaviors of the illegal variety.

1.

File-Sharing as Guilt Alleviation

Under the most plausible explanation for reciprocal exchange, file-swappers elect
to make their own files available for others to download based on what Shumaker and
Jackson have dubbed the “aversive effects of nonreciprocated benefits.”169 Drawing on a
number of experimental studies, Shumaker and Jackson argue that when an individual
receives a benefit that obviously results from the cooperation of others, she internalizes a
feeling of indebtedness. “Reciprocation . . . serves as one method available to a recipient
for alleviating the tension produced by the indebted state.”170 The best way to remove
these feelings of guilt is for her to reciprocate directly. Failing that, however, Shumaker
and Jackson found qualified support for the theory that someone “prevented from

Tilburg, Eric Van Sonderen & Johan Ormel, The Measurement of Reciprocity in Ego-Centered Networks of
Personal Relationships: A Comparison of Various Indices, 54 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 54, 55 (1991) (discussing
indirect reciprocity). File-swapping consists almost entirely of generalized exchange.
167
Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 340-44 (2001).
168
Goulder, supra note 165, at 176 (“[T]he norm is not only in some sense a defense or stabilizing
mechanism but is also what may be called a ‘starting mechanism.’ That is, it helps to initiate social
interaction and is functional in the early phases of certain groups before they have developed a
differentiated and customary set of status duties.”); supra note 157; see also Michael W. Macy, PAVLOV
and the Evolution of Cooperation: An Experimental Test, 58 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 74, 78 (1995) (“Norms of
reciprocity and conformity pose a start-up problem: if contribution requires moral or social pressure, and if
this pressure increases with the rate of contribution, what gets the system started? One possibility, Elster
suggests, is the ‘everyday Kantian’ norm to act as you would have others act. This avoids the start-up
problem because the obligation to cooperate does not depend on the extent of cooperation by others in the
group.”). Recent research suggests that when two players both cooperate in a prisoner’s dilemma situation,
portions of their brains associated with the production of pleasurable sensations are activated. Revealingly,
some of the areas were not activated when the subjects were told they were cooperating with a computer in
a prisoner’s dilemma game. James K. Rilling et al., A Neural Basis for Social Cooperation, 35 NEURON
395, 395-403 (2002). Because all subjects in the research were adult females, the study does not resolve the
question of whether these neurological benefits from cooperation are learned or innate. For an interesting
discussion of that question, see Neven Sesardic, Recent Work on Human Altruism and Evolution, 106
ETHICS 128 (1995).
169
Sally Ann Shumaker & James S. Jackson, The Aversive Effects of Nonreciprocated Benefits, 42 SOC.
PSYCH. Q. 148 (1979).
170
Id. at 149. Shumaker and Jackson’s study casts doubt on an alternative explanation—that those who
are helped experience improved moods as a result, and that being in a good mood makes one more likely to
help others. Id. at 156.
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reciprocating the donor will help a third person.”171 Conducting their own experiment, the
researchers determined that while subjects who had been helped by others but were
unable to reciprocate reported feeling guilty,172 “those who were provided with an
opportunity to benefit a third person did not report feelings of guilt or unease . . . These
data are the first to support this study’s hypothesis that reciprocating a third person may
relieve at least some of the tensions produced by being placed in an aversive state.”173
Thus, the authors concluded, helping a third person may not alleviate guilt as much as
direct reciprocation, but it is the next best thing.174 Research by Shumaker and Jackson’s
peers has resulted in similar findings.175 Indeed, the aversive affects of nonreciprocated
benefits are likely to be particularly pronounced among anonymous strangers.176 By
offsetting the guilt that accompanies purely selfish downloading, file-sharing helps
network members maintain a positive sense of self: They conceive of themselves as
sharers, team players, members of a community of sorts, and cooperators.177 They derive
utility from maintaining these positive self images.178
171

Id. at 149.
Id. at 156.
173
Id. A subsequent study provided further support for this conclusion. Amato, supra note 162, at 40
(“The finding that help received from friends and family was associated with spontaneous helping (mainly
to strangers) is curious. It may reflect generalized reciprocity; that is, people who receive a good deal of
help through their networks may feel a general obligation that can be discharged party by helping anyone—
including strangers.”) (citation omitted).
174
Shumaker & Jackson, supra note 169, at 157.
175
Daniel Bar-Tal et al., Reciprocity Behavior in the Relationship Between Donor and Recipient and
Between Harm-Doer and Victim, 40 SOCIOMETRY 293, 298 (1977); Martin S. Greenberg & Solomon P.
Shapiro, Indebtedness: An Adverse Aspect of Asking for and Receiving Help, 34 SOCIOMETRY 290, 290-300
(1971); Roberta Simmons, Mindy Schimmel & Victoria A. Butterworth, The Self-Image of Unrelated Bone
Marrow Donors, 34 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAVIOR 285, 291 (1993) (“Donating bone marrow was seen as
indirect reciprocation, a token of gratitude for their own good fortune.”); see also Paula F. Levin & Alice
M. Isen, Further Studies on the Effect of Feeling Good on Helping, 38 SOCIOMETRY 141 (proposing that
people help strangers after receiving help from an anonymous stranger because receiving help put them in a
good mood, but presenting data consistent with an aversive effects explanation for helping). The study of
bone marrow donors presents one of the better case studies by researchers seeking to understand why
people would help strangers. In the case of bone marrow donations, the costs of donating are relatively
high, consisting of pain, recovery time, and the risk of complications from the procedure. Simmons,
Schimmel & Butterworth, supra at 287. As a result, the population of bone marrow donors was unusually
altruistic, and quite unlike a random sample of the population. Id. at 290. Like file-swappers, bone marrow
donors made sacrifices (albeit much greater ones) to help people they had never met. Unlike in the fileswapping situation, however, bone marrow donors themselves were not anonymous, and might have
anticipated the gratitude of recipients and the admiration of their peers. Id. at 291-93, 296-99. These
donations therefore involved quite costly cooperation among strangers, but lacked both complete
anonymity and the absence of repeat-player interactions.
176
Bar-Tal et al., supra note 175, at 298 (“Individuals tend to feel most gratitude when they are helped
by acquaintances or strangers and least gratitude when they are helped by parents or siblings.”); Shapiro,
supra note 162, at 262 (“[F]riends are relatively unaffected by temporary imbalances in their relationship
since they have continuing exchanges and their past histories are generally equitable. Strangers, having no
past histories nor expectations of future interaction, may find temporary imbalances much more
disturbing.”).
177
It is unclear whether the brain registers the pleasure associated with the avoidance of guilt and the
pleasure associated with feeling good about helping another differently. Rilling et al., supra note 168, at
172
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Notably, reciprocation does not require a 1:1 relationship between the benefit
received and the benefit conferred on another. Rather, smaller gestures may suffice to
alleviate the aversive effects accompanying the receipt of valuable benefits from a
stranger, and in some cases the reciprocation can take a different form from the receipt of
the benefit.179 So a user who reciprocates his 100 downloads by permitting 20 uploads
may well extinguish the guilt that accompanied the act of downloading. Moreover, in
many instances where a file-sharer has downloaded 100 files, but only made twenty
available, reciprocity levels might well approach 1:1 in any event. That is because a user
only need download a file once, but it can be downloaded from him ad infinitum once it
is in his shared directory. A user who has made one-fifth of his collection available for
downloading might then be engaged in 1:1 reciprocity if his shared songs are downloaded
an average of five times each. An uploaded file can be the gift that keeps on giving.
The “aversive effects” model therefore provides one plausible explanation for
why users of these networks make their files available despite the absence of an
economic incentive to do so. Napster, Gnutella, and the other file-swapping networks all
operate on the third-party helping model described in the Shumaker and Jackson study.
Specifically, because a file transfer can only be initiated at the downloader’s request,
there are very limited opportunities to upload a file to someone from whom a fileswapper has just downloaded. File-swapping networks therefore provide their members
with the opportunity to do the next best thing: make their files available for third parties
to download. File-swappers need not upload as many files as they download. Instead,
their reciprocal instincts will often be satisfied by engaging in minor-to-moderate file
sharing with others.
It generally will not suffice for a user to make his files available to any third
party. Under the guilt alleviation theory he will prefer to return the favor to someone who
is similar in the relevant respect to the donor whose largess he earlier received. He knows
that the donor has made his files available to others for downloading, so he will feel
400. I have characterized guilt avoidance as the primary mechanism motivating cooperation because that
hypothesis seems to have the most support, but subsequent research might suggest that humans
affirmatively enjoy cooperating more than they dislike non-cooperation. Latane & Dabbs considered both
the guilt-avoidance and pleasure-seeking explanations for why people help strangers and concluded that the
view “that people help others reluctantly in order to avoid feeling bad is probably the most popular in
American social science today.” Bibb Latane & James M. Dabbs, Jr., Sex Group Size and Helping in Three
Cities, 38 SOCIOMETRY 180, 190 (1975); Cf. Dawes & Thaler, supra note 163, at 192 (“Another type of
altruism that has been postulated to explain cooperation is that involved in the act of cooperating itself, as
opposed to its results. ‘Doing the right (good, honorable, . . . ) thing’ is clearly a motive for many people.
Sometimes termed impure altruism, it generally is described as satisfaction of conscience, or of
noninstrumental ethical mandates.”); Piliavin & Charng, supra note 150, at 32 (discussing the important
connection between altruism and individual’s self-image).
178
Simmons, Schimmel & Butterworth, supra note 175, at 287-97.
179
Greenberg & Shapiro, supra note 175, at 300; see also Amato, supra note 160, at 254 (presenting
the results of a study showing that people consistently overestimate the amount of help they have given
others and underestimate the amount of help they have received from others).
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better about his uploading if he believes that the recipient is also a file-sharer. If a user
perceives that many of those taking files from him are not passing those files along to
others, his desire to reciprocate will no longer be satisfied through participation in the
network. As Thaler and Dawes hypothesize, “people have a tendency to cooperate until
experience shows that those with whom they are interacting are taking advantage of
them.”180 By magnifying the extent of file-sharing on the network and masking the
prevalence of non-sharing, charismatic code attempts to persuade the individual filesharer that the beneficiaries of his generosity are just as deserving as the people from
whom he acquired his content. It therefore avoids the extinguishment of reciprocity
obligations among its more cooperative users.181
These studies of cooperation among anonymous strangers provide a persuasive
psychological account of what motivates users of peer-to-peer networks to allow
uploading. Yet these experiments differ from the peer-to-peer situation in one important
respect. While the participants in various experiments are anonymous, they are permitted
face-to-face contact, which can establish greater empathy. The consensus among scholars
who have studied the issue previously is that participants in a public good provision
experiment are significantly more likely to cooperate if they are allowed face-to-face
communication than if they are required to communicate with each other via computer
terminals.182 Seen in this light, the high levels of cooperation observed on MusicCity are
even more startling. Whatever the experiments say, robust cooperation can emerge
among anonymous members of a computer network in the real world.183

180

Dawes & Thaler, supra note 163, at 191-92.
It is possible that another guilt-alleviation story is working in the background. Perhaps some fileswappers feel somewhat guilty about violating copyright laws, but manage to eliminate those feelings of
guilt by engaging in sharing. See infra note 132 (noting that 54% of downloaders have “some reservations”
about obtaining free music off the Internet). That sharing compounds the illegality, to be sure, but because
sharing and cooperation are generally seen as positive behaviors, such file-sharing might ameliorate the
guilty pleasures associated with downloading. Cf. Scott Rosenberg, But Isn’t It Against the Law?, Aug. 7,
2000, available in <http://www.salon.com/tech/col/rose/2000/08/07/breaking_law/print.html> (visited Dec.
20, 2001) (“People are giving stuff away—they’re sharing files for free. That’s one of the big reasons, I
think, that millions of people don’t see anything wrong with using Napster. It doesn’t feel like theft; it feels
like a great big communal swap meet.”).
182
Elinor Ostrom, A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action, 92 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 1, 7 (1998) (reviewing the literature on these kinds of experiments).
183
Why the divergence between the studies and the real world evidence? Two interesting possibilities
spring to mind. The first is that charismatic code and the very large numbers of sharers visible on these
networks overwhelms the users’ reluctance to cooperate with unseen individuals. The second is that as
users become increasingly familiar with the Internet and have their social experiences increasingly
mediated through the Internet, they develop a greater sense of empathy with anonymous, out of sight, users.
Thus, a user who has grown up participating in Internet chat rooms may feel just as much discomfort freeriding on the cooperation of other users as he would if he had to confront those users face to face. Under
this hypothesis, if one tested MusicCity’s users in a cooperation experiment, they would choose
cooperative strategies more frequently than those members of the general population who formed the pool
for the various cooperation experiments cited by Ostrom.
181
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2.

Reciprocity Cascades

Once the file-swapping networks succeed in tapping into the reciprocity norms
that their users bring to cyberspace, they can rely on several factors to further solidify
file-sharing behaviors. Cooperation tends to engender more cooperation,184 although
there are several complementary explanations for why that is so.
First, when a file-swapper is exposed to the widespread file-sharing of his fellow
computer users, his own propensity to file-share will be reinforced. Imitation is not only
the most sincere form of flattery, but it also validates and solidifies the behavior of the
person who is being imitated.185 The feedback effects sparked by multitudes of computer
users imitating each other can spark a cascade of imitation that reinforces a behavioral
norm even in the absence of social sanctions directed against nonconformists.186
Relatedly, visible sharing can make sharers out of members who have just joined the
network. Where individuals trying to decide how to behave in a new environment
observe critical masses of others engaging in certain types of behaviors, they may well
assume that those individuals must have some form of inside information prompting them
to behave in that manner.187 Rational actors therefore use others’ visible behavior as a
heuristic that helps guide their own decisions about how to behave.
Second, when users try to assess the levels of file-sharing that exist on the
networks, they are likely to assume that the majority of network users behave as they do.
Psychologists have observed that members of a network generally use their own level of
cooperativeness as a measure by which to estimate the cooperativeness of others in that
network.188 Thus, file-sharers will tend to overestimate the extent of file-sharing on the
network, and those who only download will tend to underestimate the extent of file184

Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms,
86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1589-90 (2000); Sugden, supra note 163, at 774-75, 783.
185
Michael C. Roberts, On Being Imitated: Effects of Levels of Imitation and Imitator Competence, 43
SOC. PSYCH. Q. 233, 233 (1980) (“[M]odels are attracted to an imitator and tend to subsequently imitate
those people who first imitate them. . . . [I]mitation is a form of behavioral similarity which provides
consensual validation and thus decreases uncertainty and unpredictability in the model. This then makes the
model more confident of an attitude or behavior.”).
186
Id. at 239; see also Piliavin & Charng, supra note 150, at 41 (“Experimental studies have
consistently shown that children display greater generosity when they are exposed to generous models than
to selfish models.”).
187
Cf. POSNER, supra note 84, at 41 (“Behavioral regularities can arise . . . when people make
inferences about the value of options from other people’s actions, a phenomenon that may lead to ‘herd
behavior.’ Suppose that everyone lines up to enter a fashionable restaurant . . . The herd behavior
explanation holds that people have only partial information about the quality of restaurants, and imitate
other people in the expectation that inferences based on other people acting on their partial information
reflect aggregation of information about the quality of restaurants. Thus the social norm—the behavioral
regularity of patronizing a certain restaurant—arises as a result of people’s incentives to avoid bad
outcomes that would occur if they relied on their own partial information.”).
188
Tomonori Morikawa, John M. Orbell & Audun S. Runde, The Advantage of Being Moderately
Cooperative, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 601, 601 (1995); John Orbell & Robyn Dawes, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
515 (1991); Takahashi, supra note 166, at 1130.
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sharing on the network. By magnifying cooperation and masking noncooperation, the
creators of the file-swapping networks attempt to confirm the hunch that solidifies
reciprocal propensities among file sharers. The user is inclined to believe that most
network members will share, he logs into the network and sees that quite a lot of
members are sharing content,189 and he feels that his initial intuition (and his behavior)
was validated.190
Third, it is presumed that increased cooperation engenders increased benefits for
the cooperators. This presumption is particularly true in the case of file-swapping, where
more cooperators means more new content and more sources for obtaining that content.
Therefore, as a file-swapping network comes to be characterized by increased levels of
file-sharing, participation in the network becomes increasingly attractive for file-sharers
(as well as free riders).191 Success of a file-swapping network breeds more success, as
file-swappers obtain more valuable benefits from participation and hence feel more need
to reciprocate. Thus, reciprocity cascades engender material rewards in addition to
psychic benefits.
There is, of course, a corollary to the notion of reciprocity cascades. Just as
cooperation can engender more cooperation, noncooperation can snowball. Particularly
where noncooperative behavior becomes malicious, and harms cooperators, those types
of antisocial behaviors can reverberate throughout a network, punishing the innocent, and
causing the innocent to punish the equally innocent.192
189

The Gnutella networks arguably do a better job of exploiting bounded rationality to create an
appearance of widespread sharing than networks such as Napster and Morpheus. When a user types in a
search request to Gnutella, the search will keep running indefinitely, and the list of matching files will
continue to scroll down the screen. Napster and Morpheus, by contrast, default to showed no more than 100
or so matching files.
190
Cf. Ostrom, supra note 165, at 12 (“[R]eciprocators are likely to be more optimistic about finding
others following the same norm and disproportionately enter more voluntary social dilemmas than
nonreciprocators. Given both propensities, the feedback from such voluntary activities will generate
confirmatory evidence that they have adopted a norm which serves them well over the long run.”). There is
anecdotal evidence to suggest that some community members are likely to cooperate when they see that no
one else is cooperating and when they know that their own cooperative acts will engender significant
benefits for the group or its members. This would help explain the existence of heroically cooperative acts,
such as gentiles’ harboring of Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe during the Second World War. See Kristen R.
Monroe, Michael C. Barton & Ute Klingemann, Altruism and the Theory of Rational Action: Rescuers of
Jews in Nazi Europe, 101 ETHICS 103, 112-13, 119 (1990). Even if that anecdotal evidence is indicative of
a general trend, it is not inconsistent with the theory of cooperation relied upon herein. The propensity to
cooperate still may be a function of the number of cooperators perceived by an individual who may choose
whether or not to cooperate, but the relationship between perceived cooperation and the propensity to
cooperate would be parabolic rather than linear. Thus, the instinct to cooperate is initially high when no one
else visibly cooperates, drops dramatically when a few members in a large group are seen to be
cooperating, and rises quickly as perceived cooperation increases.
191
Sugden, supra note 163, at 781–82.
192
Bar-Tal et al., supra note 175, at 293 (“Recently, several investigators have extended the principle of
reciprocity that is applied in helping situations to contexts in which harm-doing occurs. The results of these
studies have suggested that, in general, individuals tend to reciprocate harm done to them.”) (citation
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Even outside the context of computer networks and reciprocity norms, scholars
have found that when community members falsely perceive particular practices to be
widespread, they are likely to conform their own behavior to the way they believe others
are behaving. The leading work in this area is that of H. Wesley Perkins, who has
documented the phenomenon of college students persistently overestimating their peers’
levels of alcohol consumption and has argued persuasively that these persistent
misperceptions fuel more alcohol consumption than there otherwise would be.193 In the
case of alcohol consumption, where the most inebriated tend to be the most visible in
social settings such as campus parties, this visibility suggests that there is a norm of binge
drinking, and tendencies to adhere to that perceived norm cause more students to become
severely intoxicated.194 By the same token, those students who are not intoxicated are less
visible, and less likely to be the subject of after-the-fact conversations.195 Perkins writes:
“With the accumulation of conversation over time, certain college social events get the
reputation (often encouraged by the sponsors) that ‘everyone goes’ and ‘everyone gets
smashed.’ Thus a sensationalized view of the college community emerges. This powerful
mythology has a life of its own and actually encourages more students to attend parties
and get drunk than might otherwise do so.”196 Misperceptions regarding levels of alcohol
consumption can therefore become self-fulfilling prophesies, and can snowball as
misperception fuels visible intoxication, which fuels more intoxication.197 Universities
have paid attention to Perkins’s scholarship, and when they have implemented
educational programs that attempt to correct misperceptions of alcohol consumption, they
have generally seen significant decreases in the prevalence and severity of intoxication
episodes. Thus campus programs that credibly publicized the lower-than-expected
incidence of binge drinking have lowered the prevalence of overconsumption
dramatically.198
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3.

Holdouts

What explains why not everyone who downloads becomes a file-sharer in light of
the norm of reciprocity and charismatic code? There are several behavioral factors that
might overcome the reciprocity norms outlined above. For some individuals, the
increased cost of uploading or risk of adverse consequences resulting from uploading will
dominate the reciprocity norms that would urge them to share. Some individuals might
have less well-developed senses of reciprocity, for it is clear that individuals internalize
and act upon even these widespread norms to varying degrees.199 Other downloaders,
despite the better efforts of the network creators, may not view uploading as “helping,”
and therefore will not conceptualize the acquisition of content as a favor that requires
repayment.200 Finally, some downloaders will conclude, based on the large number of
other downloaders making their content available, that there is more than enough content
to go around, even without their efforts. In social psychology, this is referred to as the
“bystander effect,” and its propensity to discourage altruism has been well documented,
especially in those situations where the costs of helping are high.201 Indeed, charitable
organizations conducting fund raisers must constantly walk a fine line between extolling
the virtues of achieving an ambitious goal and appearing not to need the contributions of
the individual being solicited. Hence fund-raising letters contain schizophrenic language
such as “Last year we raised a record $5 million for our school, but this year it’s more
important than ever that you join your fellow alumni in contributing to this worthy
cause.” Such language both plays on the recipient’s desire to participate in a successful
cooperative endeavor and reminds him that bad things will happen if he withholds his
contribution.202 The same is true on the file-swapping networks: Some users are
motivated to cooperate when exposed to the purported ubiquity of file-sharing, but others
feel less guilty about free riding.

THE MINNESOTA INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE EXPERIMENT: STATE TAX RESULTS 18-19 & 25 (Apr. 1996),
available in <http://www.taxes.state.mn.us/reports/complnce.pdf> (visited Aug. 26, 2002).
199
Piliavin & Charng, supra note 150, at 32.
200
Greenberg & Shapiro, supra note 175, at 291 (“It must be pointed out, however, that reciprocation is
neither the only mode nor necessarily the preferred mode for reducing indebtedness. The individual can
reduce the magnitude of indebtedness by cognitively restructuring the situation. For example, he might
devalue the help received and / or increase the magnitude of his costs and the donor’s rewards for giving.”).
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Howard & Crano, supra note 163, at 492, 502; Latane & Dabbs, supra note 177, at 185–88; Piliavin
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202
Curiously, National Public Radio typically reports that only 10% of its listening audience
contributes during membership drives. At the same time, it supplies anecdotal evidence to suggest that
“listeners like you” are contributing: hence, the audible ringing of telephones in the background during
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4.

Alternative Explanations

As this discussion of holdouts suggests, the user population of the file-swapping
networks is hardly monolithic. Some file sharers will be motivated by strong reciprocity
urges, but for others, the desire to reciprocate will be too weak to overcome the costs of
sharing. That said, it is worth exploring some alternative explanations for file sharing on
these networks to determine whether they are consistent with the observed cooperation.
One possible explanation for file sharing is that individuals engaged in that
behavior are doing so because they derive satisfaction from thumbing their collective
noses at the recording industry and other copyright holders. Along the same lines, these
users might have some taste for rebellion against the law, and gain utility from flouting it.
According to this reasoning, file-sharing is a type of civil disobedience directed against
those entities that improperly use the copyright laws to siphon off the revenue that rightly
belongs to artists.
While this type of sentiment may have helped motivate the creators of these fileswapping networks to release their software to the public, it is unlikely that most of the
file-sharers on the network share their files because of such feelings. After all, my data
suggests that the vast majority of the file sharers on the MusicCity network engaged in
low-level sharing—making no more than a few CDs worth of music available to the
network’s users. If file sharers make their content available because of a desire to harm
copyright holders’ economic interests or because of a taste for breaking copyright laws,
then one would expect them to share their entire collections of MP3 files, rather than just
a small portion of their collections.203
Sharing a portion of one’s MP3 collection is consistent with a reciprocity story204
but inconsistent with an antipathy / civil disobedience story. Because the population of
users who share their entire MP3 collection with others appears to be relatively small,
and because acceptance of the MusicCity defaults can account for at least some portion of
that subgroup’s behavior, the hypothesis that users share their content to rebel against
copyright holders or copyright laws provides an unconvincing explanation for the
behavior of most file sharers.
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Data on the types of sound recordings downloaded by MusicCity’s users suggests that there are not
broad cultural differences in the levels of sharing prevalent on the network. Thus, for example, those who
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A related alternative explanation views uploading copyrighted content as an
expressive act. Under this theory, explaining why anonymous individuals make their
content available to other anonymous individuals on the network is no more difficult than
explaining why hundreds of thousands of people have created personalized web pages
that can be viewed by other web surfers or why tens of thousands of teenagers feel the
need to blast their favorite music from the speakers of their automobiles or dorm rooms.
Certainly, people will engage in those types of expressive activity even in the absence of
economic incentives to do so.
While this expressive theory explanation probably explains the conduct of a few
file sharers, there are several reasons why it provides a relatively unsatisfying explanation
for why the vast majority of file sharers do what they do. First, file-swappers are quite
capable of discerning which sound recordings are widely available on the networks and
which are in short supply. If the expressive explanation accounted for most of their
cooperation, then one would expect file sharers to fill their shared directories with music
by more obscure artists whose works are difficult to obtain on the networks. As it
happens, users do precisely the opposite. A common complaint among users of the
networks, music critics, and the networks’ creators is that popular, mainstream music is
vastly overrepresented on the networks and more cutting edge music is too hard to
find.205 A review of users’ shared directories confirms this, revealing that the
overwhelming majority of listeners are content to make available yet another copy of a
widely available Jennifer Lopez or Britney Spears song, rather than files by artists who
have small but deeply dedicated followings. If the expressive theory really explains why
people share, then one would expect to find a very different mix of files available for
downloading.
Second, unlike most instances of expressive activity, the type of expression that
occurs on the file-swapping networks is completely anonymous. So while individuals’
web pages almost always contain an email address that allows a user browsing the Net to
contact the publisher, the expressive activity that occurs on MusicCity or Gnutella is not
conducive to such contact or association between the publisher and the matter
published.206
Third, there is a cross-cutting motivation that may dampen the impulse to
reciprocate. By making a particular artist’s content available for downloading, a user who
enjoys that artist’s work is both disseminating the artist’s work and potentially depriving
that artist of revenue. A network user who adores a particular artist may therefore view
205
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placing that artist’s work in his shared directory as an imperfect avenue for “spreading
the gospel” about his favorite musician.

IV.

Understanding and Shaping the File-Swapping Movement

Having introduced a theoretical framework and discussed the ways in which the
file-swapping movement and file-sharing sentiment emerged, it is worth exploring some
practical implications.
This Part begins by analyzing the aftermath of the Ninth Circuit’s Napster
decision. Although the Napster decision was successful in purely legal terms—it
established clear rules and largely resolved the dispute among the parties—it was
unsuccessful in two respects: It evidently failed to rally the public around the cause of
combating copyright infringement on the Internet; and it ultimately shifted Napster users
to other file-swapping networks without making them second-guess the morality of their
actions. The Part then explores alternative strategies for addressing the societal and
economic changes that Napster and its successors have introduced.

A.

Napster and the Failure of Law as an Expressivist Tool

When, on February 12, 2001, the Ninth Circuit handed down the Napster
decision, the court had a significant opportunity to persuade the public about the
immorality of file-swapping. The decision had been eagerly anticipated for months,
received enormous media attention, and its consequences would be felt immediately.
Although the Ninth Circuit decisively rejected the legal arguments put forward by the
file-swapping camp, the opinion evidently did little to stem the widespread participation
in the networks. To the contrary, the haphazard way in which the decision dealt with
injunctive remedies may well have done more good than harm to the networks
collectively. A year and a half after the court’s ruling, file-swapping is as widespread and
prominent as it ever was. While it remains possible that the court’s ruling may alter social
norms in the long run, the early evidence should encourage boosters of file swapping.207
What accounts for the apparent failure of the Napster decision to alter users’ behavior?

1.

The Importance of the Injunction

While the Napster court devoted barely two pages of its opinion to questions
involving the scope of the injunction, it was this aspect of the opinion, rather than its

207
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primary holding, that was most important in setting the tone for the events that
followed.208
After ruling that Napster had been guilty of contributory copyright infringement
and that Napster’s users were themselves engaged in copyright infringement, the Ninth
Circuit elected to exercise restraint at the remedial stage. The court first faulted the
district court for allocating the burdens of ensuring copyright compliance improperly.209
The court then remanded to the district court for a reassessment of the proper remedies.210
The decision to remand effectively stayed injunctive relief until the district court could
rule. Three weeks passed before the district court finally ruled regarding the scope of the
injunction. Under the revised injunction, record labels would be held responsible for
informing Napster of the artists and song titles to which they held copyrights. Upon
receiving notice of a particular copyrighted file, Napster would be given three business
days to remove the file and all identical files from its directory.211
As a result of this delay in the enforcement of the Napster injunction, several
weeks passed before users observed a tangible difference in the quantity of copyrighted
files available on the system. As one might imagine, the publicity generated by the Ninth
Circuit’s ruling brought millions of users to Napster’s web site. Some were old-timers
seeking a last opportunity to stock up on files; others were newcomers who wanted to see
first hand the application that had generated so much controversy.

2.

The Porous Filter

Millions of users logged into the Napster network and, for several weeks, saw that
virtually nothing had changed. The courts had declared file-swapping illegal, yet fileswapping proceeded at a record pace. Recall that part of what made Napster such a
seductive network is that it advertised and magnified noncompliance with copyright laws.
On Napster, users learned easily what content individual users have and what they are
downloading. Napster users logged onto the system in the wake on the Ninth Circuit’s
ruling and witnessed massive noncompliance with the spirit of the court’s order. Indeed,
even the filtering system that Napster installed pursuant to the court’s order was quickly
thwarted by not-so-clever coding systems (i.e., the Beatles became the “eatlesBe,”
208
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“zBeatles,” the “Fab Four,” “John, Paul, George, and Ringo,” etc.).212 Witnessing
thousands of other users’ attempts to circumvent the injunction only fortified Napster
users’ resolve. The obvious lack of compliance with the law and with the spirit of the
court’s injunction encouraged other users to ignore the law and disregard the injunction.
Just as behavioral cascades can occur in the reciprocity context, flouting of the law can
also be self-reinforcing.

3.

The Clearinghouse for Napster Alternatives

In some sense, the continued circumvention of Napster’s copyright filtering
mechanisms were the least of the recording industry’s worries. Immediately after the
Napster decision, Napster users thronged to the on-line Napster discussion fora, where
they discussed not only various methods of getting around Napster’s screening software,
but also alternative file-swapping applications they would use in the event of Napster’s
ultimate downfall.213 Various options, such as BearShare or AudioGalaxy Satellite, were
promoted feverishly, and users were directed to the many Napster alternative applications
available on download.com. Napster’s parting blow to the record industry was therefore a
decisive one: Users who still adhered to the file-swapping norms espoused by Napster
used Napster itself as a forum for promoting alternative file-swapping networks.
Copyright holders were at least partially to blame for this use of Napster postinjunction. The Napster plaintiffs did not seek an injunction covering chat rooms or
message boards on Napster,214 presumably based on concerns that such an injunction
might not withstand First Amendment scrutiny.215 Because the injunction never applied
212
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to these fora, the recording industry could do nothing while they became communications
hubs for those seeking to undermine the spirit of the court’s ruling.

4.

The Youth Vanguard

It is likely that the high visibility of successful screening circumvention on
Napster made a particularly profound impression on younger Napster users. These are the
users who were most committed to the morality of unauthorized downloading and most
likely to engage in such behavior prior to the issuance of the injunction.216 At the time of
the Ninth Circuit’s injunction, the file-swapping communities were particularly attractive
to young computer users. Teenagers like Shawn Fanning and Gnutella creator Justin
Frankel became role models for younger peers.217
For younger Internet users, the rebelliousness embodied in the various efforts to
circumvent the Napster injunction no doubt proved quite attractive.218 Noncompliance
with the law became glamorous, and circumventing the law became a kind of game.
Whatever political capital the Ninth Circuit and the agents of copyright enforcement had
with the adult public, these institutions would receive little deference from younger users
and may be enjoined); and Orin S. Kerr, Are We Overprotecting Code? Thoughts on First-Generation
Internet Law, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1287, 1290-93 (2000) (criticizing Junger, and arguing that source
code generally is not protected speech); see generally Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456
(1978) (“Numerous examples could be cited of communications that are regulated without offending the
First Amendment, such as the exchange of information about securities, corporate proxy statements, the
exchange of price and production information among competitors, and employers’ threats of retaliation for
the labor activities of its employees. Each of these examples illustrates that the State does not lose its power
to regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to the public whenever speech is a component of that
activity.”) (citations omitted). Alternatively, a court might hold that because a restriction on speech is
necessary to avoid the thwarting of the court’s order regarding remedies, such a restriction withstands First
Amendment scrutiny. Cf. Rhinehart v. Seattle Times, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (holding that the First
Amendment does not bar courts from issuing protective orders to prevent others from publishing
information obtained through pre-trial discovery).
On the other hand, one can argue persuasively that the speech occurring in Napster’s forums
should be analyzed as commercial speech or even political speech. To the extent that users of other fileswapping networks were urging Napster users to join them, such speech might constitute commercial
speech, albeit speech not motivated by a blatant profit motive. If so categorized, the arguably unlawful
nature of the commercial transaction being proposed might grant the government significant leeway to
restrict speech promoting it. See generally Central Hudson Gas v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980). Yet, at least some of the discussion that occurred in Napster’s forum was classic political speech—
such as speech by those seeking to organize Napster users to contact Congress to express their disapproval
of the court’s actions. If a court felt that such political speech was significant and that encouraging some
speech was at least part of the purpose behind Napster’s creation of the forum, it would be quite reluctant to
restrict speech therein.
216
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who had cut their teeth in the era of free music. 219 Because the law and the federal judges
who interpret it command less respect among teenagers than among the public at large,
the Ninth Circuit could not tap into a base of good will among many Napster users. Those
teenagers and college students who disregarded the Ninth Circuit’s decision were
valorized as courageous, not dismissed as scofflaws. Teenagers understandably had little
fear of facing legal repercussions for their actions,220 and all the social incentives pointed
toward circumventing the newly announced law. Peer pressure and peer-to-peer were
perfectly aligned.221
The teenagers who playfully flouted the Ninth Circuit’s injunction in the first
weeks after its ruling and ultimately moved on to other file-swapping sites when the
injunction was tightened undoubtedly drew a number of conclusions from the experience.
On the basis of the injunction-circumvention experience, many of these teenagers have
been socialized to believe that the copyright laws and courts are largely ineffectual, and
that noncompliance with the spirit of the law is socially acceptable. Through their
exposure to a system in which the law says one thing but everybody does the opposite,
they may well have developed attitudes toward intellectual property laws that will stay
with them.222

219

Ellickson, supra note 122, at 40.
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5.

The Injunction in Retrospect

Today, it is fair to say that Napster was brought to its knees by the Ninth Circuit’s
injunction.223 The movement that Napster spawned, however, is alive and well. The few
weeks following the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in the Napster litigation were a critical period.
The decision itself galvanized file-swappers and, for a brief period, generated enormous
free publicity for the file-swapping applications. The porous Napster injunction
emboldened hackers and users alike, convincing them that while the courts could deal a
setback to the file-swapping movement, the government could never eradicate it.

B.

The Self-Help Strategy

The RIAA convinced the Ninth Circuit to set an important pro-copyright
precedent in A & M Records v. Napster, just as they had succeeded in persuading
Congress to enact aggressively pro-copyright laws such as the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act.224 While it seems likely that the recording industry may be able to
continue this success against some of the hybrids that have emerged in the wake of
Napster’s downfall, the Gnutella network presents the labels with a serious conundrum,
whereby they may well have to pursue legal actions against individual music listeners or
politically powerful Internet Service Providers if they are to clamp down on illicit fileswapping effectively. The future for the recording industry portends significant legal
costs as well as bruising public relations battles, as it confronts an environment in which
a significant percentage of the public is evidently skeptical of the need for copyright
protection of MP3s.
Given this rather unappealing scenario, it is somewhat surprising that the
recording industry has only recently begun to pursue extra-legal strategies for dealing
with the file-swapping networks. A few self-help strategies are discussed below.225

1.

Uploading Inferior or Incomplete Copies

As discussed above, the greatest assets that the file-swapping networks possess
are their ever-improving technologies and the widespread, accumulated trust among
members within the network. The technology will only get better as time passes, but the
trust is vulnerable. Had the RIAA devoted its resources to hiring saboteurs rather than
223
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investigators and attorneys, it might have undermined confidence in file-swapping during
the important time period when the technology was developing a critical mass of users.
While it would have been easier to do so when the networks were in their embryonic
stages, a committed group of a several dozen mischievous uploaders might still wreak
havoc on the Gnutella or hybrid networks. After all, a tiny segment of the Gnutella
community is responsible for creating and uploading the vast majority of the content
appearing on the network, so a small group of hyperactive uploaders could accomplish a
great deal.
Doug Lichtman and David Jacobson suggested in 2000 that the RIAA could
launch an effective counterattack against file-swapping by creating a large number of
MP3 files that are the same size and share the same titles as widely circulated
copyrighted files that are swapped over the network.226 This could be accomplished
rather easily. The RIAA versions, however, would be flawed in one of several respects:
They might contain annoying pops, screeches, skips, and buzzes throughout the record.
Alternatively, the song might be interspersed with public service announcements about
the importance of respecting copyright laws.
Two years after Lichtman and Jacobson proposed the idea, there is reason to
believe that the RIAA is actually using such a strategy. Three of the major record labels
in June of 2002 evidently began “deluging popular services like Morpheus, KaZaA and
Grokster with thousands of decoy music files that look identical to a sought-after song
but are filled with long minutes of silence—or 30-second loops of a song’s chorus.”227
While some avid file-swappers posting in a Gnutella forum report not having come
across any such files in the time since they were released, a large percentage expressed
significant annoyance at having come across the files and began brainstorming for ways
in which the recording industry’s efforts might be thwarted.228 This apparent RIAA
strategy coincides with the introduction of controversial legislation in Congress that
would authorize copyright holders to employ technology-based, anti-infringement
measures against the file-swapping networks and their users.229
226
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Because most users who upload MP3 files to others have their defaults set to
make those files they have just downloaded available for uploads by others, the faulty
files have spread quickly beyond the RIAA’s computers. The increased prevalence of
these files on the network has increased the effective cost of obtaining “free music.” The
minority of users who share files indiscriminately might respond to the development by
changing their default settings so that only those files they have listened to would be
available for downloading, and if many users took this step the availability of files on the
networks would decline noticeably. That said, revealing itself to be the creator of these
files was a strategic blunder by the RIAA. By making no secret of its involvement, the
RIAA ensured that the frustration of file-swappers would be directed at it alone. Had the
RIAA put its plan into practice surreptitiously, it might have successfully pitted the file
swappers against each other, since some ordinary users would falsely suspect each other
of having intentionally spread the corrupted copies.230 If users of the peer-to-peer
networks began having adverse experiences with greater regularity and did not have a
solitary, unsympathetic target for their anger, their could have been a cascade of
animosity that reverberated through the network.231
Theories of reciprocity suggest that while increasing the cost of uploading will
result in fewer downloads, framing file-swappers for the crime of passing along tainted
files would cause far greater long-term damage to the networks. I have argued that filesharing exists on these networks because some segment of the user population determines
that making their files available to the entire user population is a good substitute for
repaying those from whom they have downloaded files. But this presupposes that fileswappers actually feel indebted to those who have provided them with content. If covert
actions by the RIAA caused file-swappers to feel angry with those who have provided
them with content, the reciprocal chain motivating their cooperation might have
broken.232

2.

Mischievous Misidentification

The self-help strategies need not be limited to providing users with inferior copies
of content they actually desire. An even more mischievous strategy would misidentify
certain relatively undesirable songs as popular songs. For example, by labeling various
polka melodies as Britney Spears hits and distributing Mongolian throat singing MP3s as
popular Celine Dion vocals, a few dozen mischievous uploaders could quickly undermine
the trust that has characterized the file-swapping networks. Once again, these uploaders
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would only need to distribute the misidentified copies on the Internet every so often and
could count on unsuspecting users to spread those copies further.

3.

Potential Drawbacks

The RIAA might well be concerned about “sinking to Gnutella’s level” by
attempting a self-help approach. Yet, it is not at all clear that this is a well-founded
concern. The RIAA’s actions in creating spoof files were widely reported, but hardly
editorialized. Newspaper coverage has been generally neutral,233 and while file-swappers
themselves have been angered by the moves, there is no evidence that music listeners
writ large have changed their views about the record labels or copyright laws as a result
of these efforts. Those Gnutella users who have complained about the flawed MP3 files
will likely find an unsympathetic audience outside the network, since they clearly
assumed the risk of imperfection when they tried to obtain copyrighted materials for free.
A more sensible cause for concern among recording industry executives would be
that the file-swapping networks would be able to combat misidentification or flawed file
uploads through various technological innovations. Indeed, by introducing an eBay-like
technology234 that allows its users to rate a particular file’s quality, the MusicCity
network attempted to put such an infrastructure in place. On MusicCity, however, such a
rating system was cumbersome and, as a result, virtually no one used it. What works on
eBay when a auction participant must rate a handful of buyers or sellers will work much
less well on a file-swapping network, where a typical user might engage in dozens of
transactions during a single day. Less cumbersome ratings systems conceivably might be
introduced in response to a serious mislabeling threat, but only after some time elapsed,
and it may well be that the recording industry could develop technologies that would
leapfrog whatever protections the file-swapping programmers invented.235 The recording
industry need not prevent all file-swapping; it only need make file-sharing more difficult
and less attractive.236
C.

Taxing Uploading

Charismatic code has helped trigger a cooperative cascade on peer-to-peer
networks, but it has its limits. The cost of uploading is minimal for many users, so they
can be convinced to behave altruistically. Of course, the cost of uploading need not be
233
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minimal. Students receive free high-speed Internet access at many universities.
Subscribers to DSL and cable modem services generally pay a flat monthly fee rather
than paying for bandwidth based on usage. As an increasing number of file-swappers
obtain these high-speed connections, they are able to upload files more rapidly and
without slowing their downloading times appreciably. In Europe, by contrast, flat-rate
schemes have been rejected as a pricing model among residential Internet subscribers.237
The copyright industries enjoy the benefit of a sympathetic Congress and
sympathetic courts. But they lack the popular support to enforce criminal or significant
civil penalties against file-swappers. The copyright industries’ various attempts to
enforce their copyrights via what Dan Kahan calls “hard shoves” have been largely
unsuccessful because of the lack of public support for harsh sanctions against individual
copyright infringers.238 And because there is not a strong social norm against either
downloading or uploading, shame sanctions that try to target file-swappers are unlikely to
work: There would be little or no shame to accompany a public identification of an
individual as a file swapper. In order to create a moral consensus that supports the
copyright status of sound recordings, the copyright industries therefore may wish to
explore less punitive strategies.
Perhaps the most effective “gentle nudge” that copyright holders could employ
would be to convince Congress to enact a regulation on Internet Service Providers
banning flat-fee pricing on uploads by residential customers.239 Providers of residential
Internet service based in the United States, whether commercial providers or universities,
could be required by law to charge users incrementally for every upload based on the
amount of data transferred.240 This fee need not be high. A charge of a dollar per 50,000
kilobytes would easily do the trick, especially in deterring students.241 Indeed, as Clay
Skirky notes, “Napster not only takes advantage of low marginal costs, it couldn’t work
without them. Imagine how few people would use Napster if it cost them even a penny
every time someone else copied a song from them.”242 Alternatively, the federal
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government could tax such uploads directly, and collect through the Internet Service
Providers.
The introduction of such a charge on residential uploading would constitute an
enforceable effort to shut off the flow of free content that has made the file-swapping
networks possible.243 Copyright holders would be recognizing that they could neither stop
Internet users from visiting file-swapping sites nor adequately deter them from infringing
copyrights through those sites. Instead, this pricing regime would alter the incentives
sufficiently so that those users living in the United States could no longer be convinced to
upload files by charismatic code or the change agents who created it. As the continued
prevalence of file transfer disruptions on the file-swapping networks suggests, even in the
face of charismatic code’s attempts to instill a cooperative norm of reciprocity, there are
limits to the kinds of sacrifices that users will make for the benefit of anonymous fellow
users.244 If the pricing scheme governing uploads were altered, sharing content would no
longer be an almost costless virtue for users on the file-swapping network. On the fileswapping networks, such a regulation would expose the limits of peoples’ willingness to
be kind to strangers.
An incremental charging scheme will be overinclusive. Professors who wish to
share their own writings with others would face increased costs, as would rappers trying
to build their audiences by giving away content and family members sending digital
photographs over the Internet. In that sense, the Internet would look less like a free
network for exchanging information and more like a parcel post system, where the cost of
transmitting material depends on the amount of material sent. Such an alteration of the
nature of the Net could eviscerate much of what makes it such an attractive tool for
democratic self-expression and decentralized debate, among other things.245 Reasonable
people may well conclude that the tradeoffs involved exceed any anti-infringement
benefits.246 That said, it is worth underscoring that peer-to-peer file sharers will be far
more sensitive to price than their photograph swapping counterparts. People have
demonstrated a willingness to pay incremental fees to share reprints with colleagues or
243
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photographs with loved ones, but a peer-to-peer network that charges users for the
“privilege” of sharing their copyrighted content with anonymous strangers is unlikely to
succeed. Thus, in this instance where legitimate uses of a network are far less sensitive to
price than illegitimate uses, a somewhat overinclusive marginal pricing mechanism may
well be net socially beneficial.

D.

The Power of Information and Un-charismatic Code

Perhaps the copyright industries will conclude that the threat to their revenues
does not justify arguably extreme measures such as self-help or incremental taxes on
uploading. If copyright holders still wish to combat copyright infringement, but wish to
do so via less controversial means, they might mount a new sort of public relations
campaign. So far, the copyright industries’ propaganda efforts have been largely limited
to educating the public—and students in particular—about the importance of respecting
intellectual property.247 By and large, these efforts have failed to sway popular sentiment.
Users have continued to engage in file-swapping and file-sharing despite these campaigns
and despite Napster’s holding that such activities amount to copyright infringement. At
the present time, it appears that it will be quite difficult for the copyright industries to
alter the perception that participation in these networks is morally acceptable.
The copyright industries might be able to weaken file-sharing through a less
ambitious education campaign, however. The charismatic code hypothesis suggests that if
cooperative behavior is magnified and uncooperative behavior is masked, then members
of a community are more likely to cooperate. If the copyright industries could somehow
magnify noncooperative behavior and mask cooperative behavior, they should be able to
undermine cooperation and perhaps even trigger a cascade of noncooperative behavior.
How might these goals be accomplished?
One strategy would be for the copyright industry to publicize statistics that reflect
actual rates of sharing on the file-swapping networks. For example, the Adar and
Huberman study’s finding that two-thirds of all Gnutella users share no files presents a
damaging counterpoint to the impression of widespread file-sharing that is presented by
Gnutella’s charismatic code. Particularly if follow-up work reveals that Gnutella’s rates
of file sharing have not increased significantly in the time since Adar and Huberman
collected their data, the copyright industries could devote resources to convincing
Gnutella users that there is a norm of free-riding on Gnutella. If Gnutella’s users believe
this data—and that’s a big “if”—then that statistic could make file sharing scarcer still.
Of course, if the MusicCity network, on which my data suggests sharing is more common
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than free riding, is typical of the hybrids, publicizing such data might not have a
detrimental effect on file-sharing rates.
A significant problem with such a simple education program is that its message is
unlikely to be internalized among the members of the target audience. File-swappers may
view any claims made by the copyright industries or their surrogates as inherently suspect
in light of those industries’ motives for causing people to believe that there is a norm of
free-riding.248 Moreover, even if people hear the message that free riding is the norm on
Gnutella and believe it at some level, if that message is inconsistent with the observed
distortion created by the charismatic code, then the statistic may seem less “real” than the
distortion.249
An alternative “education” strategy might confront charismatic code on its own
terms. Given the open-source nature of the Gnutella applications for file-swapping, the
record labels are free to create “patches” or updates to existing versions of Gnutella. The
recording industry might find it worthwhile to develop and distribute software patches
that expose users to the many free-riders on Gnutella and magnify the actions of those
free riders. For example, the program might identify free-riders and those sharing very
few files prominently in responding to search queries. Alternatively, the patch might
prominently gather and display real time updates concerning the number of free riders on
the network and the median number of files being shared. In order to convince fileswappers to download these patches, the creators of these patches would need to create
desirable improvements that enhanced the experience of using these applications, and
bundle these improvements with the un-charismatic code elements. Provided such
patches were widely disseminated, the recording industry might effectively combat the
distortion created by charismatic code. By providing file-swappers with a more realistic
assessment of their peers, the recording industry might well prompt them to imitate the
free-riding behavior that is still somewhat common on these networks.

E.

Strengthening the File-Swapping Movement

The foregoing discussion presumes that the reader’s orientation is toward
controlling copyright infringement in light of litigation’s apparent failure to do so. But
one can use insights about charismatic code and reciprocity to buttress the file-swapping
networks as well. Indeed, while the Napster court almost certainly reached the proper
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result under existing copyright laws, the wisdom of those laws is open to serious
question. Those who see file-swapping as a laudable effort to undermine a copyright
regime that is inefficient, subject to interest group capture, and irreconcilably contrary to
social norms regarding the appropriate use of media files ought to be thinking about ways
in which the applications’ code can better tap into norms of reciprocity.250
While the various file-swapping networks all employ some sort of charismatic
code with varying degrees of success, each application could do a better job of
encouraging uploading. For example, KaZaA allows a user to peek at the shared directory
of another user who is downloading from him. By making such searches available, the
software potentially permits a user to discover that some portion of those who are
downloading from him are not sharing with others. By disabling this feature, KaZaA
could render invisible those users who were sharing no files. Alternatively, the software
might identify new users using a particular color code or symbol during their first week
of participation in the network. By doing so, the network’s creators would indicate to its
membership that these newer users, who were relatively unlikely to have amassed large
collections of MP3 files were not being uncooperative, but had merely not had a chance
to engage in substantial sharing.
The networks might also begin showing users how their own sharing can
reverberate through the system. For example, the software easily could be designed to
track not only the number of uploads a particular user had provided, but the number of
times the copies he passed along had themselves been copied. Such information would
demonstrate to users that others were cooperating along with him by sharing the files they
had acquired, and would also emphasize that a single upload was likely to engender
benefits for many downstream users of the network.

V.

Conclusion

The file-swapping networks present a fascinating case study for those who study
networks of illegality and technologies for intellectual property infringement. A third
group of scholars ought to be quite interested in studying file-swapping networks,
however. These scholars, the social norms theorists, examine instances in which
behavioral regularities arise among groups in response to social pressures and in which
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those regularities have little or no resemblance to formal law. In this instance, tens of
millions of file-swappers are behaving in ways that flout the nation’s copyright laws.
To date, the norms theorists have said little about the file-swapping phenomenon.
That silence stems in part from norms theorists’ understandable caution in moving
beyond the realm of close-knit groups. Yet, as social psychologists have demonstrated,
there are persuasive explanations for why we might see cooperative behavior even in
those environments where free riding is easy, repeat-player interactions are rare, and
anonymity is widespread. The explanations are different, but they are no less compelling.
As one who is sympathetic to the social norms perspective, but cognizant of its
present limitations, I have begun to explain how these behavioral regularities might arise
in loose-knit groups. My article suggests that in certain environments people may
internalize cooperative norms that are consistent with meta-norms of reciprocity. It
further suggests that community members’ perceptions of their peers can be selffulfilling, and that the file-swapping networks’ creators have successfully designed a
world in which their members see each other through rose-colored glasses. Charismatic
code, which magnifies cooperative behavior and masks uncooperative behavior, can be a
powerful tool for instituting a cooperative arrangement and solidifying nascent
cooperative norms. Although they are almost as loose-knit a community as one can
imagine, the file-swappers trading files on Gnutella and the hybrids have come to acquire
some of the cooperative attitudes and customs that one would ordinarily expect to find in
much closer-knit groups. Indeed, for many file-swappers, reciprocal predilections easily
trump any preference for behaving lawfully.
The strategies that copyright holders have employed so far have failed to reduce
the prevalence of file swapping. Copyright holders, like legal scholars generally, have
focused too much attention on what the law should be with respect to copyright
infringement via the Internet and too little attention on understanding the powerful
motivations that have caused tens of millions of Americans to ignore copyright laws. If
norms, and not the law, are what motivates consumers to act, then a wiser strategy for the
RIAA and their allies might be to think about ways in which they might weaken the
cooperative norms that have arisen among users of these networks. Creators of
copyrighted content should try to understand what makes users cooperate with
anonymous strangers. Once they have figured that out, they might apply their creativity
to the interesting problem of developing strategies for undermining the substantial but
vulnerable trust that permeates these online communities. Because uploading, not
downloading, is the weak link in these file transfers, strategies that weaken the impulse to
upload are most likely to succeed.
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